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USING ESTABLISHED MEDICAL CRITERIA TO 
DEFINE DISABILITY: A PROPOSAL TO AMEND 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN* 
SERGE A. MARTINEZ**  
W. PAUL MCKINNEY***  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)1 prohibits 
discrimination in employment,2 public services,3 and public 
accommodations4 against individuals with disabilities.5 The threshold 
question, however, of who is an individual with a disability has proven to be 
more complicated, contentious, and confusing than any of the ADA’s 
drafters ever could have imagined. The law does not prohibit all 
discrimination based on disability, and it does not prohibit discrimination 
against all individuals with disabilities. Instead, it prohibits disability-based 
discrimination against a subset of individuals with disabilities who have “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits” the individual in one 
or more major life activities.6  
The initial problem with the ADA’s definition of “individual with a 
disability” is not that it is too broad or too narrow—only that it is too vague. 
Congress chose not to list what impairments were covered under the law, 
perhaps realizing that many common impairments—such as asthma, 
diabetes, and epilepsy—vary widely in severity. Instead, it adopted a scheme 
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 1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1994). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994). 
 3. Id. § 12132. 
 4. Id. § 12182. 
 5. Id. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). 
 6. See id. § 12102(2)(A). 
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in which determinations of coverage under the ADA are made on a case-by-
case basis, giving consideration to the severity of the impairment and its 
effect on the individual. The vagueness of the definition of “individual with a 
disability” has frustrated employers and other parties responsible for 
complying with ADA requirements. It has also left individuals uncertain of 
whether they have standing to ask for the reasonable accommodations 
reserved under the law for individuals with “covered” disabilities.  
Perhaps the entities most troubled by the lack of statutory guidance have 
been the courts. The first decade of ADA case law has produced a series of 
inconsistent and implausible results exemplified by three Supreme Court 
decisions in 1999. 7 Far from providing clarity and guidance, the Supreme 
Court decisions cut a wide swath through the ADA, undermining its basic 
intent and erecting frequently insurmountable barriers to the redress of 
disability discrimination.  
Part II of this Article traces the legislative history of the coverage 
provision of the of ADA and of its predecessor statute, the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973.8 It also explores the conceptual underpinnings of the statutory 
scheme of attempting to cover only individuals with severe disabilities. Part 
III analyzes the major cases involving coverage under the ADA, including 
the trilogy of 1999 Supreme Court cases. It traces the consequences of the 
Court’s decisions as reflected in the subsequent lower court decisions and 
their devastating effects on individuals with disabilities.  
Part IV contains a proposed amendment to the ADA to clarify the 
definition of “individual with disabilities.” Under the amendment, Congress 
would authorize the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
after notice and comment rulemaking, to publish medical standards for 
determining when the most common physical and mental impairments are 
severe enough to be covered under the ADA. The ADA would presumptively 
cover an individual whose condition meets the criteria; it would 
presumptively not cover an individual whose condition does not meet the 
criteria. Either party could rebut the presumption with clear and convincing 
evidence that, in light of the particular individual’s overall medical condition, 
the impairment was or was not a substantial limitation of a major life activity. 
This approach provides greater certainty to all parties and saves time and 
money in litigation.  
Part V provides a demonstration of the feasibility and utility of this 
approach. After selecting several of the impairments most commonly at issue 
 
 
 7. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
 8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 705, 791-94 (1994). 
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in ADA cases, the Article reviews the medical literature for each condition. It 
then distills the medical criteria already used in the clinical setting to 
distinguish mild or moderate medical conditions from ones that constitute a 
substantial limitation of a major life activity. Only the latter conditions would 
be presumptively covered under the proposed amendment of the ADA. 
Besides the practical advantages of the amendment, it is consistent with the 
original intent of the ADA: prohibiting discrimination against individuals 
with substantially limiting disabilities without imposing an undue burden on 
employers, government entities, and providers of public accommodations. 
Although the Article focuses on employment, the definition of disability 
applies to all of the titles of the ADA. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE REHABILITATION ACT AND THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
A. Rehabilitation Act 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first comprehensive federal law 
prohibiting disability-based discrimination in employment and other aspects 
of daily life. Congress laid the groundwork for the Rehabilitation Act in the 
1960s when it enacted sweeping civil rights legislation proscribing 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,9 and 
age.10 The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act, as restated in the 1978 
amendments, “is to develop and implement, through research, training 
services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and 
coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living.”11  
Three key sections of Title V of the Rehabilitation Act pertain to 
employment and prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities 
by the federal government (section 501),12 federal government contractors 
(section 503),13 and recipients of federal financial assistance (section 504).14 
For purposes of Title V of the Rehabilitation Act, an individual with a 
disability is defined as “any person who (i) has a physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major 
life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as 
 
 
 9. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). 
 10. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994). 
 11. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984. 
 12. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1994). 
 13. Id. § 793. 
 14. Id. § 794. 
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having such an impairment.”15 “Major life activities” means “functions such 
as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, 
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”16  
The legislative history surrounding the nondiscrimination provisions of 
the Rehabilitation Act, particularly section 504, reflect more happenstance 
than deliberation or historical imperative. As related by Richard K. Scotch in 
his book, From Good Will to Civil Rights: Transforming Federal Disability 
Policy:  
As it was initially drafted, the legislation did not include Section 504. 
Nor was Section 504 suggested at any of the hearings held on the 
proposed law. Rather, the section was conceived by Senate committee 
staff members and added to the bill at a relatively late point in the 
legislative process. 
. . . .  
 Staff members were concerned that, when disabled individuals 
completed their training in the VR [vocational rehabilitation] system 
and were ready to enter the workplace, many employers appeared to 
be reluctant to hire them. Staff members felt that the final goal of the 
VR program, getting disabled people into the mainstream of society, 
was being blocked by negative attitudes and discrimination on the part 
of employers and others. 
 Someone suggested that language be included in the Rehabilitation 
Act proscribing discrimination against handicapped people in 
federally assisted programs. Such a provision would be comparable to 
the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and to Title 
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, but would not involve 
amending those statutes. Roy Millenson of Senator Javits’s staff had 
been involved in the development of the Education Amendments, and 
he ran out to his office and brought back language from Title VI. The 
language was adapted and inserted at the very end of the 
Rehabilitation Act. In the version of the bill that was ultimately 
enacted, that provision became Section 504.17  
 
 
 15. Id. § 706(8)(B)(i)-(iii). For a discussion of the history of the definition used in Title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act, see Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 
100-03 (2000). 
 16. 1 C.F.R. § 457.103(2) (2000). 
 17. RICHARD K. SCOTCH ,  FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/4
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Title V of the Rehabilitation Act has been amended several times, making 
relatively minor changes in the law’s coverage. Amendments in 197818 and 
198819 clarified the Rehabilitation Act’s coverage of alcoholics, drug 
abusers, and individuals with contagious diseases. The 1986 amendment 
changed the term “handicapped individual” to “individual with handicaps.”20 
In 1992, the term was again changed, this time to “individual with 
disabilities.”21 None of these amendments changed the basic statutory 
scheme of prohibiting discrimination only against individuals with 
substantially limiting impairments.  
In the absence of congressional guidance about the definition of 
“individual with disabilities” in Title V of the Rehabilitation Act, the courts 
reached divergent results. Some of the courts held that Title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act covered relatively minor conditions.22 For example, in 
Perez v. Philadelphia Housing Authority,23 the district court held that a 
temporary back sprain was a handicap,24 and therefore the Rehabilitation Act 
required the employer to provide accommodations such as giving the 
employee a straight back chair, allowing the employee to use an elevator, and 
assigning other employees to handle the individual’s duties during regular 
breaks.25 
Numerous other cases have not been nearly as sympathetic to plaintiffs, 
adopting the view that Title V of the Rehabilitation Act applies only to 
substantially limiting impairments.26 For example, in Forrisi v. Bowen,27 the 
 
 
DISABILITY POLICY 49, 51-52 (1984). See also EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ,  DISABLED POLICY : 
AMERICA ’S PROGRAMS FOR THE HANDICAPPED 212 (1987). 
 18. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984-85. 
 19. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32 (1988). 
 20. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 103(d)(1), 100 Stat. 1807, 
1810. 
 21. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 102(p), 106 Stat. 4344, 
4355-56. 
 22. Professor Feldblum argues that this was the prevailing view, and lists many of the cases 
holding for the plaintiffs. Feldblum, supra note 15, at 106-13. 
 23. 677 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff’d , 841 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 24. Id. at 361. 
 25. Id. at 359. 
 26. For cases holding that the plaintiff did not have a covered handicap under the Rehabilitation 
Act, see, e.g., Reeder v. Frank, 986 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1993), aff’g  813 F. Supp. 773 (D. Utah 1992) 
(speech impediment); By rne v. Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 567 (7th Cir. 1992) (allergy to fungus); 
Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992) (decreased sensation to heat in two 
fingers); de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1986) (left handedness); Oesterling v. 
Walters, 760 F.2d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1985) (mild to moderate varicose veins); Jasany v. United States 
Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985) (strabismus); Partlow v. Runyon, 826 F. Supp. 40, 
46 (D.N.H. 1993) (chronic back strain); Paegle v. Dep’t of Interior, 813 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D.D.C. 1993) 
(temporary back injury); Santiago v. Temple Univ., 739 F. Supp. 974, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1990) 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a telephone 
company employee, whose job required him to climb utility poles, was not a 
“handicapped individual” under the Rehabilitation Act because he suffered 
from acrophobia.28 The court reasoned: 
The Rehabilitation Act assures that truly disabled, but genuinely 
capable, individuals will not face discrimination in employment 
because of stereotypes about the insurmountability of their handicaps. 
It would debase this high purpose if the statutory protections available 
to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone whose 
disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was 
widely shared.29 
B. Americans with Disabilities Act 
The Rehabilitation Act applies only to a limited number of covered 
entities, and it provides only limited private remedies for aggrieved 
individuals.30 Consequently, Congress enacted more sweeping legislation, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.31 The ADA’s five titles deal 
with employment (Title I),32 public services (Title II),33 public 
accommodations (Title III),34 telecommunications (Title IV),35 and 
 
 
(intermittent eye inflammation); Pridemore v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 625 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (S.D. Ohio 
1985) (borderline cerebral palsy); Tudyman v. United Air Lines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 
1984) (muscular physique); Green v. Union Pac. R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wash. 1981) 
(hypertension, obesity, minor osteoarthritis).  
 27. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 28. Id. at 933. 
 29. Id. at 934. 
 30. See LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW §§ 1.10-1.14 (2d ed. 1997). Section 
501 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against and mandates the hiring of individuals 
with disabilities by federal agencies. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1994). Section 501 incorporates by reference 
the same remedies found under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.6-.10, 101.1-.131 
(2000). Section 503 prohibits discrimination against and mandates the hiring of individuals with 
disabilities by federal contractors with over $10,000 in annual federal contracts. 29 U.S.C. § 793 
(2000). Remedies under Section 503 include injunctive relief, withholding progress payments, 
terminating the contract, and debarring the violator from receiving future government contracts. 41 
C.F.R. § 60-741.65-.66 (2000). Finally, Section 504 prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability 
by recipients of federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Like Section 501, the remedies 
and procedures of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are incorporated by reference into Section 504. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (1994). 
 32. Id. §§ 12111-17. 
 33. Id. §§ 12131-65. 
 34. Id. §§ 12181-89. 
 35. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994) (telecommunications relay services); 47 U.S.C. § 611 (1994) (closed 
captioning). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/4
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miscellaneous issues (Title V).36 Although the ADA is unique in concept and 
breadth, it draws heavily on the Rehabilitation Act.37 In particular, the ADA 
incorporates the same definition of “individual with disabilities.”38  
The ADA’s legislative history clarifies what it means to be substantially 
limited in a major life activity. The Report of the Senate Committee on Labor 
and Human Resources defines a substantial limitation of one or more major 
life activities as “the individual’s important life activities [that] are restricted 
as to the condition, manner, or duration under which they can be performed 
in comparison to other people.”39 Nevertheless, neither this report nor any 
other document from either house of Congress provides any indication that 
Congress recognized it was adopting a narrow scope of coverage, 
explanation why it selected this method of limiting coverage, or articulation 
why it rejected a different or more general type of coverage.40 The 
Rehabilitation Act model was chosen for adoption in the ADA with little 
debate.  
Cases decided under the ADA have consistently approved of the limited 
coverage approach.41 Indeed, the courts have been so restrictive in 
interpreting the statutory definition of an individual with a disability that the 
limited coverage approach has been extended beyond that intended by 
Congress. Several examples of restrictive decisions appear in Part III.  
C. Statutory Coverage in Perspective  
It is valuable to consider the legislative scheme of the disability 
discrimination laws in the light of other civil rights laws. Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 196442 prohibits all discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin. Although the main purpose of the 
law was to prohibit discrimination against African Americans,43 Title VII 
outlaws any discrimination on the basis of the five statutorily-proscribed 
criteria. Thus, the law is violated by race discrimination against a member of 
any race,44 religious discrimination against a member of any religion,45 sex 
 
 
 36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-13. 
 37. Id. § 12117(b). 
 38. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
 39. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 22 (1989). 
 40. See Feldblum, supra note 15, at 129-34. 
 41. See 1 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL ., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.40 (2d ed. 1999). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 20003-2000e-17 (1994). 
 43. See Rep. William M. McCulloch et al., Additional Views on H.R. 7152 (1964), reprinted in 
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2513-17. 
 44. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 (1973). 
 45. See Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp., 747 F. Supp. 1118, 1126 (D.N.J. 1990). 
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discrimination against a member of either sex,46 and national origin 
discrimination against an individual of any national origin.47 Courts 
sometimes state that the complainant in a Title VII case must be a member of 
a “protected class,”48 but this is simply incorrect. Title VII prohibits 
discrimination against any individual for a statutorily proscribed reason. By 
contrast, when Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) in 1967, it did not prohibit all age discrimination, but only age 
discrimination against the “protected class” of individuals aged forty and 
over.49 The reason for the seemingly different approach is that Congress was 
specifically and exclusively concerned about discrimination against older 
American workers.50  
When it enacted disability discrimination laws in 1973 and 1990, 
Congress used the “protected class” model of the ADEA rather than the 
comprehensive model of Title VII.51 It did not prohibit all disability 
discrimination, but only disability discrimination against the “protected 
class” of individuals with severe disabilities. Individuals with minor or 
temporary impairments were not covered.52 The original version of the ADA, 
drafted by the National Council on the Handicapped and introduced in 1988, 
did not use the “protected class” approach, but proposed to prohibit any 
discrimination based on handicap.53 When the business community and the 
Reagan Administration complained that coverage under this approach was 
 
 
 46. See Miller v. Weber, 577 F.2d 75, 76 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 47. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973). 
 48. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 527 (1993); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 
114 F.3d 1332, 1337 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1994). As originally enacted, the law prohibited discrimination in 
employment against individuals between the ages of forty and sixty-five. In 1978, Congress extended 
the upper age limit to seventy, and in 1986, Congress removed the upper limit completely. See 1 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL ., supra  note 41, § 2.37, at 317.  
 50. See S. REP. NO. 95-493 (1977), reprinted in  1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504; DEVELOPMENTS IN 
AGING: 1997 AND 1998, S. REP. NO. 106-229, at 83-98 (2000). See also  Marley S. Weiss, Risky 
Business: Age and Race Discrimination in Capital Redeployment Decisions, 48 MD. L. REV. 901, 
1004-05 (1989). 
 51. Congress not only prohibited discrimination, but it mandated reasonable accommodation as 
well. See generally Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 
(2001). 
 52. See Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 1998); 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2000) (stating that to constitute a disability under the ADA, an impairment must be 
significant); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. (2000) (explainin g that an individual is not substantially limited 
in a major life activity if an impairment does not amount to a significant restriction when compared to 
the abilities of the average person). In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), the 
Supreme Court limited the applicability of the “regarded as” prong of the definition by requiring that 
the impairment that the individual is regarded as having would constitute a substantial limitation of a 
major life activity. Id. at 489.  
 53. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications 
of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 432-33 (1991). 
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overly broad, subsequent bills adopted the Rehabilitation Act’s framework of 
limited coverage and extended protections only to individuals who have an 
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.54  
There are important policy arguments that could be made in favor of 
limited coverage. Individuals with severe disabilities have been the victims 
of pervasive and long-standing discrimination in employment. Individuals 
with temporary or minor impairments have not been subject to such 
discrimination, nor have they been subject to prejudicial myths and 
stereotypes about their employability. If someone with a temporary 
impairment, such as a common cold or a sprained ankle, were subject to 
discrimination, the effect of the discrimination would be short-lived and the 
individual’s long-term employability would not suffer. Also, if one employer 
acted irrationally by discriminating against someone with a minor 
impairment (e.g., wearing eyeglasses), other employers would not be likely 
to make such arbitrary decisions. By contrast, before the enactment of the 
ADA, there was a history of employment discrimination against individuals 
who use wheelchairs and thus have decreased mobility, who have vision 
impairments that may require assistive devices, and who have medical 
impairments that may increase employee health benefit costs.55  
Congress may have deliberately intended to limit the coverage of the 
ADA, and it may have had a legitimate reason in choosing to enact a 
disability discrimination law with limited coverage. Nonetheless, Congress 
failed to define the ADA’s coverage with any degree of specificity. The 
clarity of the ADEA, prohibiting discrimination against individuals aged 
forty and over, is impossible to achieve with general statutory language in a 
law prohibiting discrimination based on numerous types of physical and 
mental impairments. The limitation of the ADA’s coverage to individuals 
with a physical or mental impairment that substantia lly limits one or more of 
the individual’s major life activities is simply too vague to provide 
meaningful guidance to individuals, employers, and courts. Consequently, 
 
 
 54. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY , EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY : THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 82-83 (1997). Professor Chai Feldblum, one of the drafters of the 
ADA, disagrees with this explanation. In her view, the decision about coverage of the ADA “was 
arrived at by a small group of individuals, early in the process of drafting the ADA, who made the 
legal judgment that the existing definition would cover most people along the spectrum of physical and 
mental impairments, and the political judgment that using any other definition would unnecessarily 
slow down passage of the bill.” Feldblum, supra  note 15, at 129. 
 55. Under the ADA, as under the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994), and 
other laws, the determination of disability is as much a policy question as a question of fact. See 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA.  L. REV. 397, 413 (2000) 
(citing Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security 
Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833, 853 (1976)). 
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there has been a series of troublesome issues surrounding the definition of an 
individual with a disability that have not been satisfactorily resolved. The 
question of whether an individual’s impairment should be considered with or 
without regard to mitigating measures, discussed in the following section, is 
one of these issues. 
III. CASE LAW INTERPRETING THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
A. Sutton and Mitigating Measures  
1. Sutton v. United Air Lines  
In 1992, Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton, twin sisters with a “life long 
goal to fly for a major air carrier,”56 interviewed with United Air Lines for 
commercial airline pilot positions. At the interviews United informed them 
that their uncorrected vision did not meet United’s minimum requirements,57 
and that it would not hire them as pilots on a prestigious international route. 
The sisters alleged that United violated the ADA by rejecting them on the 
basis of a disability.58 The sisters contended that their impaired vision—when 
judged in its uncorrected condition—substantially limited them in the major 
life activity of seeing, and precluded them from such “normal everyday 
activities . . . as driving, watching television, or shopping.”59 United 
countered that because the sisters used corrective measures to mitigate their 
impaired vision, they were not substantially limited in any major life 
activity.60  
In an unreported decision, the United States District Court for the Distict 
of Colorado held that “far more” than the ability to see without correction is 
required to trigger coverage under the ADA.61 Recognizing that the ADA 
does not define “substantial impairment,” “substantially limits,” “major life 
activities,” or “being regarded as having an impairment,” the court turned to 
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA.62 The court 
 
 
 56. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 895 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 57. Id. United’s requirement was uncorrected vision of 20/100 or better in each eye. Each sister 
had 20/200 in her right eye, and 20/400 in her left eye. The sisters claimed they were qualified for the 
pilot positions because, with corrective lenses, their vision was 20/20 or better. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 896.  
 61. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., CIV. A. No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *3 (D. Colo. 
Aug. 28, 1996). 
 62. Id. at *2-3. 
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explained that EEOC Interpretive Guidance63 provided that “the existence of 
an impairment is to be determined without regard to mitigating measures 
such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.”64  
The court, however, chose to reject the EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 
instead holding that the sisters did “not allege any activity that they [were] 
unable to perform that the average person in the general population [could] 
perform.”65 The court noted an ostensible public policy behind the ADA: 
only “individuals who suffer from impairments significantly more severe 
than those encountered by the average person in everyday life” should be 
covered by the ADA; not those “who suffer from slight shortcomings that are 
both minor and widely shared.”66 The court stated: 
To adopt a definition of “disabled” that would include persons whose 
vision is correctable by eyeglasses or contact lenses would result in an 
expansion of disability protection beyond the logical scope of the 
ADA. . . . Under such an expansive reading, the term “disabled” 
would become a meaningless phrase, subverting the policies and 
purposes of the ADA and distorting the class the ADA was meant to 
protect.67 
In granting United’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 
court held that “[e]ven if the Plaintiffs’ uncorrected vision would be 
considered an impairment, a physical impairment, standing alone, is not 
necessarily a disability as contemplated by the ADA because the statute 
requires an impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities.”68 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision, joining a minority of courts that 
viewed the EEOC Interpretive Guidance on mitigating measures as in direct 
conflict with the ADA.69 The court held that “[t]he determination of whether 
 
 
 63. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 31630.2(h)&(j) (1998). 
 64. Sutton, 1996 WL 588917, at *5. 
 65. Id. at *3. 
 66. Id. at *5 (citations omitted). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (citations omitted). 
 69. Cases that endorse the minority position of ignoring the EEOC Interpretive Guidance include 
Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767-68 (6th Cir. 1997); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 
85 F.3d 187, 191 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) (dictum); Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 
n.6 (E.D. Okla. 1997); Gaddy v. Four B Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331, 337 (D. Kan. 1997); Moore v. City 
of Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081, 1088 (D. Kan. 1996); Schluter v. Indus. Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 
1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994).  
 In his Sutton dissent, Justice Stevens argued for the majority approach of judging impairments 
without reference to mitigating measures. He cited to the holdings of eight of the nine federal courts of 
appeals to consider the issue, all of which held that Congress intended to consider disabilities in their 
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an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity should 
take into consideration mitigating or corrective measures utilized by the 
individual.”70 The Tenth Circuit also held that while the sisters’ unmitigated 
impairments would be disabilities under the ADA, their vision problems 
failed to substantially limit a major life activity after taking into consideration 
their corrective lenses.71 
The Tenth Circuit observed what has become the Sutton paradox.72 
Prospective plaintiffs with potential disabling impairments, like the sisters in 
Sutton, lose under any set of facts. If, even with correction, their vision 
impairment is so severe that it substantially limits their major life activity of 
seeing, they are not qualified individuals for an employment position.73 If 
 
 
unmitigated condition. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 496 (1999) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citing Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 
1998); Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998); Baert v. 
Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 
F.3d 854, 859-66 (1st Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 
(3d Cir. 1997); Doane v. Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 
102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 
1996)). 
 Justice Stevens also referred to three executive agencies that issued regulations or interpretive 
bulletins construing the ADA. 527 U.S. at 496 (citing 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 App. § 1630.2(j) 1998; 28 
C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A, § 35.104 (1998); 49 C.F.R. Pt. 37.3 (1998)). See also REPORT OF THE HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. NO.101-485 III (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 
451, quoted in  527 U.S. at 500 (“The impairment should be assessed without considering whether 
mitigat ing measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-than-
substantial limitation.”); REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, H.R. REP. 
No. 101-485 II (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 304, 334, quoted in 527 U.S. at 500 (“Whether 
a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, 
such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.”). 
 70. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902.  
 71. Id. at 902-03. 
 72. This paradox also has been referred to as a “Catch-22.” See Deborah Kaplan, The Definition 
of Disability: Perspective of the Disability Community, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 352, 361 
(2000); Lawrence Postal, To Be or Not to Be: The ADA Catch-22, WASH . LAW., July/Aug. 2000, at 28. 
 73. Paradoxical results are inevitable under a statutory scheme in which only some individuals 
with disabilities are afforded statutory coverage, especially where, as under the ADA, only individuals 
with severe disabilities are covered. Thus, under the ADA, an employer lawfully may make the wholly 
irrational decision to refuse to hire an individual based on a minor or temporary impairment such as a 
cut finger or a common cold. Yet, an employer violates the ADA if it makes the arguably more 
rational decision to refuse to hire an individual with AIDS or cancer, assuming the individual is 
currently capable of performing the job.  
 One way of conceptualizing the issue is as follows. Imagine impairments on a continuum from the 
most minor to the most severe. The ADA divides the impairments into three parts along the 
continuum. On one end are the impairments that are too minor to be covered; on the other end are the 
impairments that are so severe that the individual is not able to perform the job. Only individuals who 
have impairments in the middle range—impairments more severe than minor ones, yet not severe 
enough to have the effect of preventing the individual from performing the job—are subject to the 
protections of the ADA. Although Sutton and its companion cases do not create this structure, by 
considering impairments in their mitigated state they have the effect of expanding the range of 
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their vision is correctable, it does not substantia lly limit their major life 
activity of seeing, and they are not covered under the ADA. Notwithstanding 
its recognition of the dilemma, the Tenth Circuit held that the sisters’ 
amended complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to support the conclusion 
that their uncorrected vision constituted a physical impairment under the 
ADA. It explained, “[W]e refuse to construe the . . . [ADA] as a handout to 
those who are in fact capable of working in substantially similar jobs.”74 
The Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of seven-to-two.75 In Sutton and 
two companion cases,76 the Court held that mitigating measures should be 
considered in determining whether an individual is disabled under the 
ADA.77 Writing for the seven-member majority, Justice O’Connor opined 
that the approach of the EEOC Interpretive Guidance—that persons are to be 
evaluated in their hypothetical uncorrected state—was “an impermissible 
interpretation of the ADA.”78 She wrote that “it is apparent that if a person is 
taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, 
the effects of those measures—both positive and negative—must be taken 
into account when judging whether that person is ‘substantially limited’ in a 
major life activity.”79 She reasoned that because the ADA is phrased in the 
present verb tense, a “disability exists only where an impairment 
‘substantially limits’ a major life activity, not where it ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or 
‘would’ be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.”80 
Using this interpretation, the Supreme Court stated that individuals with 
mitigating measures more serious than eyeglasses and contact lenses—for 
instance, prosthetic limbs, epilepsy and high blood pressure medicine—
might still be covered under the ADA.81 In theory, a plaintiff would simply 
need to show that he or she is substantially limited in a major life activity.82 
However, in reality much of the case law that has followed Sutton has 
 
 
impairments considered too minor to be covered. The result is that there are two large ranges of 
uncovered conditions (those too minor and those too severe) flanking a narrow range of covered 
conditions that are just severe enough. Such a scheme seems at odds with the statutory intent of the 
ADA as a comprehensive remedy for the redress of disability-based discrimination. 
 74. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 906 (quoting Hileman v. City of Dallas, Tex., 115 F.3d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 
1997)). 
 75. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 494-95 (1999). 
 76. On June 22, 1999, the Supreme Court also decided Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg , 527 U.S. 
555 (1999), and Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc ., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
 77. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482; Albertson’s, Inc., 527 U.S. at 565; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521. 
 78. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 482. 
 81. Id. at 488. 
 82. Id. 
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indicated that it is difficult, if not impossible, to prevail on a “substantially 
limited” claim after taking mitigating measures into account.83 
Further confusing the issues, Justice O’Connor refused to give deference 
to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance ignoring mitigating measures, while 
noting that the Tenth Circuit’s opinion conflicted with other circuit courts.84 
She wrote that the EEOC approach would “require courts and employers to 
speculate about a person’s condition and would, in many cases, force them to 
make a disability determination based on general information about how an 
uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the 
individual’s actual condition.”85 Justice O’Connor reasoned that under the 
EEOC guidelines, all diabetics would be disabled because “they would be 
substantially limited in one or more major life activities” if they did not 
properly supervise their blood sugar and insulin levels.86 She explained that 
“the guidelines approach would create a system in which persons often must 
be treated as members of a group of people with similar impairments, rather 
than as individuals. This is contrary to both the letter and spirit of the 
ADA.”87 
Justice O’Connor also stated that the EEOC approach “could . . . lead to 
the anomalous result that . . . courts and employers could not consider any 
negative side effects suffered by an individual resulting from the use of 
mitigating measures.”88 In addition, she said that the EEOC’s approach was 
inconsistent with Congress’s finding that 43 million Americans have 
physical or mental disabilities:  
 
 
 83. See infra  Part III.A.4. 
 84. Id. at 477 (citing, e.g., Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 329 
(2d Cir. 1998); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998); Matczak v. 
Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997)).  
 85. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.  
 86. Id. at 483. This assertion is not true from a medical standpoint. Diabetes, like epilepsy, 
asthma, hypertension, and numerous other common disorders have a wide range of severity. A rule 
that considered medical impairments in their unmitigated state would not necessarily result in ADA 
coverage of all of the cases of a disorder. Justice O’Connor was concerned with potential 
overinclusiveness, but she did not address the issue of underinclusiveness. 
 87. Id. at 483-84. 
 88. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484. The EEOC approach would permit the consideration of side effects 
from medications. For instance, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance intends that the determination of 
qualified individuals with a disability must be made on a “case by case” basis. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, 
App. (2000). Also, several of the circuit courts that, prior to Sutton, followed the majority approach of 
deferring to the EEOC Interpretive Guidance have also considered side effects from mitigating 
measures. See Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., 152 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1998) (only 
“serious impairments” like diabetes and epilepsy will be assessed in their unmitigated state; permanent 
corrections will be evaluated based on the mitigated condition); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 
760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that mitigating measures themselves might cause a substantial 
limitation). After Sutton, EEOC issued new guidance about mitigating measures. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(h)-(j) (2000). 
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[T]he 43 million figure reflects an understanding that those whose 
impairments are largely corrected by medication or other devices are 
not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA . . . .  
 . . . .  
 Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected 
physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly 
would have cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the 
findings.89 
Finally, Justice O’Connor stated that a corrective device alone, such as a 
prosthetic limb, does not eliminate a disability.90 Individuals are still 
disabled, notwithstanding their corrective device, if those individuals are 
substantially limited in a major life activity. For instance, an individual who 
uses a wheelchair may be capable of functioning in society, but is still 
disabled based on a substantial limitation in the major life activity of walking 
or running. 91 Alternatively, one who uses high-blood pressure medication 
may still be “regarded as” disabled by a qualified entity.92 “The use or 
nonuse of a corrective device does not determine whether an individual is 
disabled; that determination depends on whether the limitations an individual 
with an impairment actually  faces are in fact substantially limiting.”93  
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg found that the “strongest 
clues” to Congress’s intended range of the ADA’s domain is its finding that 
the 43 million disabled Americans are “a discrete and insular minority . . . 
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a 
position of political powerlessness in our socie ty.”94 She found that 
Congress’s declarations conflict with “the enormously embracing definition 
of disability petitioners urge.”95 Justice Ginsburg argued that by using the 
 
 
 89. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 486-87. Justice O’Connor alluded to a 1986 National Council on 
Disability Report estimating that there were over 160 million disabled under the “health conditions 
approach,” which looks at all conditions that impair the health or normal functional abilities of an 
individual. She also cited a National Advisory Eye Council study claiming that over 100 million 
Americans have visual impairments. Id. at 485, 487 (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE 
HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE  10 (1986); NATIONAL ADVISORY EYE COUNCIL, U.S. DEPT. 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VISION RESEARCH : A NATIONAL PLAN: 1999-2003, at 7 (1998)). 
 90. Id. at 488. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 494 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)). 
 95. Id. 
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phrase “discrete and insular minority,” Congress intended to confine ADA 
coverage to a historically disadvantaged class.96 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens cited to agency and legislative evidence that 
Congress intended to consider disabilities in their unmitigated condition.97 
Reviewing the committee reports on the bill that became the ADA, he stated 
that it is “abundantly clear” that Congress designed the ADA to cover 
persons “who could perform all of their major life activities only with the 
help of ameliorative measures.”98 He also deferred to the EEOC’s 
Interpretive Guidance: “[T]he uniform agency regulations merely confirm 
the message conveyed by the text of the Act—at least insofar as it applies to 
impairments . . . or any condition . . . that is substantially limiting without 
medication.”99  
The dissent also reached a different conclusion as to the ADA’s 
breadth—whether it reaches 43 or 100 million disabled individuals: 
So long as an employer explicitly makes its decision based on an 
impairment that in some condition is substantially limiting, it matters 
not under . . . the Act whether that impairment is widely shared or so 
rare that it is seriously misunderstood. Either way, the individual has 
an impairment . . . and . . . should be protected against irrational 
stereotypes and unjustified disparate treatment on that basis.100  
Justice Stevens also reasoned that because only two percent of the 
population suffers from 20/200 vision or worse, like the sisters in Sutton, 
Congress “obviously intended to include” individuals with this impairment 
under the ADA.101 Finally, disagreeing with Justice O’Connor’s opinion, he 
contended that failure to factor mitigating measures into the determination of 
disability would not cause courts and employers to speculate about 
hypothetical conditions: “Viewing a person in her ‘unmitigated’ state simply 
requires examining that individual’s abilities in a different state, not the 
abilities of every person who shares a similar condition. It is just as easy 
individually to test petitioners’ eyesight with their glasses on as with their 
glasses off.”102 
 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 496, 499-503. 
 98. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499. 
 99. Id. at 502. 
 100. Id. at 507. 
 101. Id. (citation omitted). 
 102. Id. at 509 (footnote omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/4
p243 Rothstein book pages.doc  8/5/2002   5:58 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] USING MEDICAL CRITERIA TO DEFINE DISABILITY 259 
 
 
 
 
In his separate dissent, Justice Breyer argued in favor of a statutorily-
defined approach to defining disability. 103 He wrote that the drawing of 
statutory lines  
l) will include within the category of persons authorized to bring suit 
under the [ADA] some whom Congress may not have wanted to 
protect (those who wear ordinary eyeglasses), or 2) will exclude from 
the threshold category those whom Congress certainly did want to 
protect (those who successfully use corrective devices or medicines, 
such as hearing aids or prostheses or medicine for epilepsy).104 
Justice Breyer suggested that the EEOC, “through regulation, might draw 
finer definitional lines, excluding some of those who wear eyeglasses . . . 
thereby cabining the overly broad extension of the statute the majority 
fears.”105 
2. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg 
On the same day it decided Sutton, the Supreme Court also issued its 
opinion in Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.106 Hallie Kirkingburg, an 
experienced truck driver, suffered from amblyopia, an uncorrectable 
condition that left him with 20/200 vision in his left eye.107 Pursuant to 
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, Kirkingburg underwent a 
vision test in August 1990 and was erroneously certified to drive by the 
examining physician.108 In December 1991, Kirkingburg took time off from 
work to recover from an on-the-job injury. Prior to returning to work, in 
November 1992, Kirkingburg underwent another examination. This time the 
medical examiner informed Kirkingburg that, due to his impairment, he 
would need to obtain a DOT waiver in order to be legally qualified to 
drive.109 Kirkingburg applied for a DOT waiver, but Albertson’s fired him 
because he did not meet the basic DOT vision standard.110 In 1993, the DOT 
granted Kirkingburg a waiver, but Albertson’s refused to re-hire him.111 
 
 
 103. Id. at 513 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 513. 
 105. Id. at 514. 
 106. 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
 107. Id. at 558-59. 
 108. Id. at 559. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 560. 
 111. Id. 
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Kirkingburg sued Albertson’s, claiming that his firing violated the 
ADA.112 The district court granted Albertson’s motion for summary 
judgment, holding that Kirkingburg was not otherwise qualified to perform 
the job of truck driving.113 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
concluding that Kirkingburg had presented “uncontroverted evidence” that 
his vision was extremely monocular, and that “the manner in which he sees 
differs significantly from the manner in which most people see.”114 
Addressing the condition of monocular vision on a per se classification, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the difference in Kirkingburg’s vision from the 
general population was sufficient to establish a disability.115  
In his majority opinion, Justice Souter held that “the Ninth Circuit was 
too quick to find a disability.”116 In determining whether Kirkingburg’s 
monocularity was a disability, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider 
Kirkingburg’s ability to compensate for his impairment.117 Referring to 
Sutton, Justice Souter held that mitigating measures must be taken into 
account when judging whether an individual possesses a disability: “We see 
no principled basis for distinguishing between measures undertaken with 
artificial aids, like medications and devices, and measures undertaken, 
whether consciously or not, with the body’s own systems.”118 
Justice Souter held that the determination of disability under the ADA is 
not a per se, categorical test based on an impairment’s name or 
characteristics.119 Rather, the impairment should be judged on a case-by-case 
basis of its effect on the individual’s major life activity. 120 The majority held 
that the Ninth Circuit had failed to properly determine the degree of 
Kirkingburg’s visual loss.121 It explained: “We simply hold that the Act 
requires monocular individuals, like others claiming the Act’s protection, to 
prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in 
terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field, 
is substantial.”122 
 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 561. 
 114. Kirkingburg v. Albertson’s, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 564. 
 117. Id. at 565. 
 118. Id. at 565-67. 
 119. Id. at 566. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 566-67. 
 122. Id. at 567. 
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3. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 
The third case in the trilogy was Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.123 
UPS fired Vaughn Murphy, a mechanic whose job requirements included 
driving commercial vehicles, because his blood pressure exceeded DOT 
health certification requirements.124 Murphy had suffered from high blood 
pressure since the age of ten.125 For over twenty-two years, he had 
performed, without any trouble, mechanic positions not requiring DOT 
certification.126 Murphy contended that his hypertension limited his ability 
“to run, eat, . . . breath[e], hear, and see.”127 Because of his hypertension, 
Murphy did not lift heavy objects, run to answer the phone, work above his 
head, or perform heavy work.128 At the time UPS hired him, Murphy’s blood 
pressure exceeded DOT requirements, but he was erroneously granted 
certification.129 On October 5, 1994, after discovering the error, UPS fired 
Murphy.130 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment in 
favor of UPS, holding that Murphy, in his medicated state, was neither 
substantially limited in a major life activity nor regarded as disabled.131 
Citing to its decision in Sutton, the Tenth Circuit held that an individual 
claiming a disability under the ADA should be assessed with regard to 
mitigating or corrective measures.132 The Tenth Circuit noted that when 
Murphy was medicated, he “function[ed] normally doing everyday activity 
that an everyday person does.”133 However, Murphy complained that even 
when medicated enough to meet DOT blood pressure standards he suffered 
from severe side effects including “stuttering, loss of memory, impotence, 
lack of sleep, and irritability.”134 
Referring to its holding in Sutton, the Supreme Court held that the result 
of Murphy was “clear”: when determining whether an individual is disabled, 
a court must consider any mitigating measures.135 Despite the fact that 
 
 
 123. 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
 124. Id. at 519-20. 
 125. Id. at 519. 
 126. Id. at 524. 
 127. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 875 (D. Kan. 1996). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519-20. 
 130. Id. at 520. 
 131. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., No. 96-3380, 1998 WL 105933, at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 11, 
1998). 
 132. Id. at *2. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 976. 
 135. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.  
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Murphy’s hypertension medicine did not completely control his condition, 
and imposed additional negative side effects, the Supreme Court held that 
Murphy’s high blood pressure did not substantially limit him from any major 
life activity.136 Thus, Murphy was not disabled under the ADA. 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that Murphy’s unmedicated 
hypertension substantially limited several major life activities.137 Justice 
Stevens emphasized that without medication, Murphy “would likely be 
hospitalized.”138 He concluded that “unlike Sutton, this scarcely requires us 
to speculate whether Congress intended the Act to cover individuals with this 
impairment. Severe hypertension, in my view, easily falls within the ADA’s 
nucleus of covered impairments.”139  
4. Lower Court Decisions Following Sutton 
In the wake of Sutton and its companion cases, several lower courts have 
relied on the effects of mitigating measures to hold that plaintiffs failed to 
satisfy the ADA’s definition of disability. For example, in Spades v. City of 
Walnut Ridge,140 the Eighth Circuit held that because counseling and 
medication controlled a police officer’s depression, his suicidal tendencies 
were not covered under the ADA. Another court held that a plaintiff who 
failed to take medication necessary to mitigate an impairment was not 
covered where the condition could be mitigated by medication.141 Similarly, 
in Todd v. Academy Corp.,142 a federal district court in Texas held that 
 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 525. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. 186 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 141. Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that 
plaintiff who failed to take medication necessary to mitigate an impairment was not covered). 
 142. 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454 (S.D. Tex. 1999). See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 351 
(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that mild epilepsy, largely controlled by medication, not covered); Hein v. All 
Am. Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that hypertension treated with 
medication not covered); Taylor v. Nimock’s Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
heart condition treated with medication not covered); Ivy v. Jones, 192 F.3d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that hearing impairment treated with hearing aid not covered); Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 
298, 314 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that asthma treated with medication not covered); Kramer v. Hickey-
Freeman, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that bipolar disorder treated with 
medication not covered); Horwitz v. L. & G. Stickley, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(same); Popko v. Pa. State Univ., 84 F. Supp. 2d 589, 593 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that successfully 
treated idiopathic epilepsy not covered); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1106 
(S.D. Ind. 1999) (holding that treated diabetes not covered). But see EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
233 F.3d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that cane used by employee with neuropathy did not 
‘automatically’ mitigate condition); Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that epilepsy which remained severe and uncontrolled even when treated with medication was a 
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epilepsy, when treated with medication, is not a disability under the ADA. 
The court strictly followed the mitigating measures language from Sutton, 
even though the plaintiff, when under medication, suffered from weekly 
seizures lasting between five and fifteen seconds.143 The court said that the 
danger this plaintiff posed was “light” because of a phenomenon called the 
“aura effect,” where the employee was aware of the seizure before it 
occurred and could remove himself from any dangerous employment 
situation.144 
Following the reasoning of Kirkingburg, another court held that 
mitigating measures include “physiological” measures.145 In Ditullio v. 
Village of Massena,146 a federal district court in New York held that a police 
officer was not disabled under the ADA, even though he was nearly blind in 
one eye. The court held that because of his excellent vision in his other eye, 
the officer was not precluded from the major life activity of seeing.147 
Astonishingly, the court held that the officer was not substantially limited in 
any major life activity, despite the fact that he had a twenty-five percent loss 
of his overall visual system, a fourteen percent loss of use of his entire body, 
cloudy vision, and problems with depth perception and light sensitivity.148 
The Ditullio  court quoted from Kirkingburg: “[M]itigating measures must be 
taken into account in judging whether an individual possessed a disability. 
We see no principled basis for distinguishing between measures undertaken 
with artificial aids, like medications and devices, and measures undertaken, 
whether consciously or not, with the body’s own systems.”149 
Not surprisingly, the aftermath of Sutton has been that numerous courts 
have held a wide range of conditions to be mitigated by a wide range of 
measures. These measures include hearing aids,150 inhalers,151 and various 
medications.152 The mitigating measures themselves, however, may be the 
cause of a disability,153 such as where medications have disabling side 
effects154 or medical appliances limit mobility.155 
 
 
covered disability). 
 143. Todd , 57 F. Supp. 2d at 453-54. 
 144. Id. at 453. 
 145. Ditullio v. Village of Massena, 81 F. Supp. 2d 397, 406 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 146. Id. at 407. 
 147. Id. at 406. 
 148. Id. at 403, 407. 
 149. Id. at 406 (quoting Abertson’s v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999)). 
 150. Ivy v. Jones, 192 F.3d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 151. Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 314 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 152. See cases cited supra note 142 . 
 153. See Lauren J. McGarity, Note, Disabling Corrections and Correctable Disabilities: Why Side 
Effects Might Be the Saving Grace of Sutton, 109 YALE L.J. 1161 (2000). 
 154. See, e.g. , Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 309 (3d Cir. 1999) (lithium taken 
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5. Putting Sutton in Perspective  
The Court’s decision in Sutton has been severely criticized. According to 
Senator Tom Harkin, chief sponsor of the ADA, “[E]mployers want to have 
it both ways. They want to argue that a person is too disabled not to do the 
job, but not disabled enough to be protected by the ADA.”156 Senator Harkin 
went on to say that Sutton and its companion cases  
undermined one of the most basic principles of the ADA . . . . The 
definition [of disability] under the statute is intended to provide a 
broad range of people with disabilities protection against 
discrimination. These three cases erode that intent and jeopardize 
basic anti-discrimination protections for millions of Americans.157 
In addition, according to Chai Feldblum, Georgetown University law 
professor and one of the ADA’s drafters, the three cases “illustrated the 
absurdity and illogic of the situation. After this, the only people who we 
know have a disability are those who are blind, deaf and in a wheelchair, and 
those who have HIV.”158 
The amicus briefs filed in Sutton shed light on the consequences of the 
case. Several of the amicus briefs requested bright-line guidance for the 
determination of a disability. For example, the brief of AIDS Action159 
pointed out that under the Rehabilitation Act’s guidelines, insulin-controlled 
diabetes—as well as medicated epilepsy and seizure disorders—were 
covered as disabilities. The guidelines expressly state that federal 
nondiscrimination law coverage extends beyond “traditional disabilities” and 
 
 
for mental impairment caused nausea and cognitive deficits); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 
F.3d 1226, 1236 (9th Cir. 1999) (medications taken for mental disorder caused impotence among other 
medical problems). 
 155. See Belk v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (leg brace used 
because of polio limited individual’s range of motion). 
 156. Press Release, Tom Harkin, Supreme Court Rulings on ADA Cases (June 22, 1999) (on file 
with the Drake Law Review), quoted in Stacie E. Barhorst, What Does Disability Mean: The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in the Aftermath of Sutton, Murphy and Albertsons, 48 
DRAKE L. REV. 137, 170 (1999) [hereinafter Harkin Press Release]. Senator Harkin issued this press 
release in response to the Supreme Court’s rulings in Sutton and its companion cases. Barhorst, supra , 
at 170. Employers could argue that individuals with disabilities want to have it both ways—to be 
considered severely impaired and therefore covered by the ADA, but not so impaired that they cannot 
perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation. The latter scenario, however, is precisely 
what was contemplated by the ADA. 
 157. Harkin Press Release , supra  note 156, at 169-70. 
 158. Barhorst, supra  note 156, at 170 (quoting David G. Savage, ADA Umbrella Starting to Close, 
A.B.A.J., Aug. 1999, at 44). 
 159. Brief of Amici Curiae AIDS Action et al. in Support of Petitioners, Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (Nos. 97-1943, 97-1992), 1999 WL 88763, at *4. 
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includes many diseases that are correctable with mitigating measures, 
“including hearing impairments, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, [and] 
heart disease.”160 Consequently, if the ADA was based on the policies, goals, 
and history of the Rehabilitation Act,161 Congress must have intended to 
incorporate a similar interpretation into the ADA. 
In support of United Air Lines, the Society for Human Resource 
Management (SHRM) amicus brief162 asserted that human resource 
departments lack the medical expertise to foresee how physical and mental 
conditions will affect employees in the workplace. The SHRM called for a 
“clear, simple rule” that would not lead to “conflicting court rulings” and 
“hopeless confusion” on the part of employers and employees.163 Although 
the SHRM received the result it was asking for—permission to judge 
potential employees in their unmitigated state—it is not clear that its 
members have been saved from the “hopeless confusion” decried in its brief.  
The brief of the AFL-CIO164 requested consideration of the “biological 
level of the state of the individual’s physiological systems.” The AFL-CIO 
argued that the level of risk posed by Sutton’s disability depended on 
“medical and aviation expertise, data and careful analysis.”165 The AFL-CIO 
argued that, according to established medical guidelines, if a disorder 
materially diminishes an individual’s body system, “then it should be 
considered an ‘impairment,’ regardless of whether the individual 
compensates for this worsening or diminishment by corrective measures.”166  
The facts in Sutton may have influenced the outcome: the Court might not 
have wanted to tell commercial airlines that they could not establish rigorous 
vision standards for their pilots. Such a concern would be consistent with 
numerous lower court decisions, but extremely troubling nonetheless. At this 
stage of the litigation in Sutton, the issue was simply whether the plaintiffs 
were covered by the ADA—not whether United Air Lines had a legitimate 
safety reason for excluding them from the positions they sought. Rather than 
 
 
 160. Id. at *6. 
 161. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (2000) (ordering the development of procedures governing actions 
based on both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to both avoid duplication of effort and to prevent 
imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(1) (2000) (stating that the 
ADA does not impose lesser standards than those found in the Rehabilitation Act). 
 162. Brief of Amici Curiae Society for Human Resource Management in Support of Respondents, 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (Nos. 97-1943, 97-1992), 1999 WL 160319, at 
*1-2. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Brief of Amici Curiae the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations in Support of the Petitioners, Sutton, 527 U.S. 516 (No. 97-1943), 1999 WL 86514, at 
*2. 
 165. Id. at *11. 
 166. Id. at *14 (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 898-99 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
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allowing cases such as Sutton to be decided on the merits, numerous courts 
of appeals have affirmed dismissals or summary judgments for the 
defendants on the issue of statutory coverage.167 Many of these cases should 
be decided on the merits of whether the individual can perform the essential 
requirements of the job safely and efficiently.168 
The definition of “individual with disabilities” under the ADA is a 
political question of how many individuals should be entitled to protection 
against discrimination. The ADA’s coverage of only the “protected class” of 
individuals with severe disabilities is defensible, especially from a political 
standpoint, based on a desire to eliminate discrimination against individuals 
historically subject to discrimination. Nevertheless, public policy strongly 
suggests that as a matter of legislative and judicial construction, all 
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. This approach 
simply permits plaintiffs the opportunity to prove that they were 
discriminated against because of their disability. From an employer’s 
standpoint, there may well be additional costs in defending the merits of 
employment decisions, but the basic policies of employers need not be 
changed. Based on the ADA, the overwhelming majority of employers have 
adopted policies of nondiscrimination on the basis of disability in general—
not nondiscrimination on the basis of disability against individuals with 
disabilities who can survive a motion to dismiss based on lack of coverage 
under the ADA. Thus, Sutton granted employers a litigation advantage, but 
created a greater loss to plaintiffs and the national policy of 
nondiscrimination on the basis of disability embodied in the ADA. 
 
 
 167. See Sotolongo v. New York City Transit Auth., 1073, 2000 WL 777958, at *3 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished table decision); Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2000); Murphy v. Village 
of Hoffman Estates, 234 F.3d 1273, 2000 WL 1093007, at *5 (7th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table 
decision); Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 2000); Wilson v. Bernalillo, 
211 F.3d 1279, 2000 WL 485129, at *5 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).  
 Undoubtedly, this is one reason why plaintiffs lose over ninety percent of ADA cases in the 
federal courts. See American Bar Association Commission on Mental and Physical Disability, Study 
Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL AND 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403 (1998); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Backlash Against the ADA: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 1, 8 (2000) (citing Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for 
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R. -C.L. L. REV. 99, 108 (1999) (citing Ohio State University studies showing 
that plaintiffs lose ninety-four percent of the time in district court, and that nearly half of the infrequent 
plaintiffs’ victories are reversed on appeal)). 
 168. For a discussion of proposed revisions to the “direct threat” language of the ADA, see infra 
text accompanying note 161. 
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B. Other Definitional Issues 
The definition of “individual with disabilities” has troubled courts in areas 
other than the issue of mitigating measures. For example, the courts are 
divided on the issue of whether an employee who exhibits the minor 
symptoms of a serious illness is covered under the ADA. The Ninth Circuit 
held that an employee who took a four-month leave of absence to recover 
from a psychological impairment caused by bladder cancer surgery did not 
have a covered disability because the psychological impairment was only 
temporary.169 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the side effects of 
chemotherapy for lymphoma, including “weakness, dizziness, swelling of the 
ankles and hands, numbness of the hands, the loss of body hair, and 
vomiting,” were not disabling conditions.170 In a much more well reasoned 
opinion, however, the Seventh Circuit held that the intermittent pressure 
ulcers of a paraplegic employee, which caused her to stay at home for several 
weeks, were part of her overall disability, and therefore subject to ADA 
protection.171 
The courts also have struggled to decide whether an individual who has 
recovered from a serious health condition to the point of being able to resume 
work without restrictions is nonetheless covered under the statute as having a 
disability. The First Circuit held that a scrap metal salesperson, who had 
suffered a heart attack and spent seven days in a hospital undergoing 
angioplasty, might be covered under the ADA despite his subsequent full 
recovery.172 In reversing the district court, the First Circuit cited with 
approval to the EEOC’s compliance manual, which provides that an 
impairment does not have to be permanent to be a disability under the 
ADA.173 According to the court, severe conditions that last more than a few 
 
 
 169. Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996). See also  McDonald v. 
Commonwealth of Pa., 62 F.3d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that employee who requested two 
months of unpaid leave following abdominal surgery was not covered because disability was of 
limited duration). 
 170. Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 909, 915 (11th Cir. 1996). See also 
Cook v. Robert G. Waters, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1463, 1469 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that headaches 
caused by brain tumor not a disability). 
 171. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995). See also  Roush v. 
Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that intermittent bladder infections were part of 
employee’s overall bladder condition and that there was an issue of fact as to whether that condition 
constituted a disability). 
 172. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996). Contra Gerdes v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 
125 F.3d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that employee who had undergone a coronary angioplasty 
and continued to have limitations on his ability to work was not disabled). 
 173. Katz, 87 F.3d at 31. 
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months and are potentially long term may constitute disabilit ies.174 In a 
questionable, contrary decision, the Fifth Circuit held that a woman with 
breast cancer who underwent a lumpectomy and radiation treatment was not 
disabled because she was able to return to work and perform her essential 
duties.175  
The issue of when the ability to work establishes that the plaintiff is an 
individual with a disability has proven to be a particularly difficult task for 
the lower courts. According to the EEOC, the “inability to perform a single, 
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation [of] the major life 
activity of ‘working.’”176 Whether an individual is substantially limited in the 
major life activity of working depends on the “geographical area to which the 
individual has reasonable access,” the number and types of similar jobs from 
which the individual is disqualified because of the impairment, and the 
number and types of other jobs from which the individual is disqualified 
from employment because of the impairment.177 An individual’s inability to 
perform his or her former job does not necessarily mean that the individual is 
substantially limited in the major life activity of working. 178 The courts have 
held that an individual assessment is needed,179 which often requires the 
court to compare the plaintiff’s ability to work “to the average person having 
comparable training, skills, and abilities.”180 
Finally, in Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams,181 an assembly line 
worker who developed carpal tunnel syndrome from the use of pneumatic 
tools brought an action under the ADA alleging that her inability to perform 
manual tasks was a disability for which her employer failed to provide 
reasonable accommodations. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the 
plaintiff did not have a disability under the ADA.182 Justice O’Connor, author 
of the majority opinion in Sutton, used similar reasoning in Williams. 
 
 
 174. Id. at 32. 
 175. Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1996). Accord  Madjlessi v. 
Macy’s W., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 736, 741 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (breast cancer); Cannizzaro v. Neiman 
Marcus, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 465, 476 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (brain surgery). See generally Jane Byeff Korn, 
Cancer and the ADA: Rethinking Disability, 74 CAL. L. REV. 399 (2001) (discussing treatment of 
cancer survivors under the ADA). 
 176. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2001). See Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 
1088 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 177. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (2001). See Swain v. Hillsborough County Sch. Bd., 146 F.3d 
855, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1998).  
 178. Boulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 179. Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 180. Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). 
 181. 122 S. Ct. 681, 686 (2002). 
 182. Id. at 694. 
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When it enacted the ADA in 1990, Congress found that “some 
43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental 
disabilities.” §12101(a)(1). If Congress intended everyone with a 
physical impairment that precluded the performance of some isolated, 
unimportant, or particularly difficult manual task to qualify as 
disabled, the number of disabled Americans would surely have been 
much higher. . . .  
 We therefore hold that to be substantially limited in performing 
manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or 
severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central 
importance to most people’s daily lives. The impairment’s impact 
must also be permanent or long-term.183  
IV. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
A. Congressional Options  
Any proposal for congressional action to amend the definition of 
disability under the ADA should be evaluated based on the following criteria: 
(1) whether it would restore the appropriate level of coverage under the 
ADA; (2) whether it would provide greater clarity on the standards for 
coverage; and (3) whether it would be politically feasible. 
These criteria may be applied to the three main ways in which Congress 
could attempt to resolve the problems created by the Supreme Court decision 
in Sutton. First, Congress could legislatively overrule Sutton and declare that 
in determining ADA coverage, courts must consider individuals’ 
impairments in their unmitigated state.184 This option has the advantage of 
simplicity and narrowness, and it is clear that the sole purpose of the 
amendment would be to overrule the Supreme Court’s erroneous 
interpretation of congressional intent.185 On the other hand, such an 
amendment would not provide any degree of clarity to employers, 
 
 
 183. Id. at 691.  
 184. In Dahill v. Police Dep’t of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 963 (Mass. 2001), the court held that 
under Massachusetts law, disabilities should be considered in their unmitigated condition. The court 
declined to adopt the approach of Sutton. Id. at 964. 
 185. Responding to a series of unpopular decisions during the Supreme Court’s 1989 term, 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This legislation amended the ADA by, inter alia , 
providing punitive and compensatory damages in cases of intentional discrimination based on an 
individual’s disability and allowing for a jury trial. See Timothy D. Loudon, The Civil Rights Act of 
1991: What Does It Mean and What Is Its Likely Impact?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 304, 307-08 (1992).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p243 Rothstein book pages.doc  8/5/2002   5:58 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
270 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:243 
 
 
 
 
employees, or the lower courts in resolving the numerous other problems in 
defining who is covered under the ADA. 
Second, Congress could amend the ADA to prohibit all discrimination in 
employment based on disability.186 This proposal has the advantage of 
making disability discrimination parallel to the categories of discrimination 
prohibited by Title VII. It also has the advantage of simplicity. Unfortunately 
it would require a major rewrite of the ADA and would extend the coverage 
well beyond the Act’s original intended definition of individuals with 
substantially limiting disabilities. Consequently, this approach is politically 
infeasible. 
Third, Congress could revise the definition of an “individual with 
disabilities” to add greater clarity, consistency, and predictability without 
changing the basic approach of limiting coverage to those individuals with 
substantially limiting disabilities. Congress could amend the ADA to 
authorize the EEOC, after notice and comment rulemaking, to establish 
statutory presumptions of coverage. The proposed amendment, its rationale, 
burden of proof, and analogs in existing laws are discussed in detail below. 
The advantages of the proposal include the following: (1) it is consistent with 
the congressional intent of the ADA by covering the class of individuals with 
substantially limiting disabilities who historically have experienced, and 
often continue to experience, disability discrimination;187 (2) it is consistent 
with the approach already used in several federal and state disability laws; (3) 
it provides clarity and certainty for a wide range of issues related to ADA 
coverage; and (4) it is politically feasible because it advances the interests of 
both employers and employees without changing the basic scheme of the 
ADA. 
B. The Proposed Amendment and Its Rationale 
Congress should authorize and direct the EEOC, after notice and 
comment rulemaking, to publish medical standards for determining disability 
for the most common physical and mental impairments. An individual whose 
 
 
 186. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1 (West Supp. 2002) adopts another approach to the definitional 
issue in at least the following two respects. First, it provides that disabilities should be considered in 
their unmitigated states. Id.  § 12926.1(c). Second, unlike the ADA, which requires that a disability 
constitute a “substantial limitation” of a major life activity, the California law merely requires that the 
disability constitutes a “limitation” of a major life activity. Id. § 12926.1(d). 
 187. For commentary generally supporting the view of limited coverage of the ADA, see Samuel 
Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law 
Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act? , 79 N.C. L. REV. 307 (2001); Miranda Oshige 
McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27 (2000).  
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medical condition met the published criteria would be presumptively covered 
under the ADA. Failure to meet the criteria would mean that the individual 
was presumptively not covered under the ADA. For many common 
impairments with a range of severity, the published standards list would 
include the medical criteria for determining when the condition was severe 
enough to be covered under the ADA. Although the rulemaking 
contemplated by the amendment would be new, the use of medical criteria 
for determining severity of medical conditions and impairments would not. 
Medical practice guidelines and standard diagnostic and treatment protocols 
routinely designate the medical criteria for determining when a condition is 
mild, moderate, or severe. These determinations are crucial in the clinical 
setting to indicate the appropriate course of treatment. This proposed 
amendment would merely apply established medical criteria to simplify and 
clarify the legal issue of coverage under the ADA. In its rulemaking 
proceedings, the EEOC should consult with the American Medical 
Association, the various medical specialty colleges, the Institute of Medicine 
of the National Academy of Sciences, and other appropriate organizations to 
develop consensus views on the medical criteria for distinguishing a minor 
impairment from a severe impairment.  
Although the EEOC would publish criteria for the most common physical 
and mental impairments, the regulation’s list of covered conditions would be 
nonexclusive. It is impossible to include every medical condition. 
Furthermore, the effect of a particular impairment on any particular 
individual cannot be calculated in the abstract, and it is often necessary to use 
an individualized determination of the degree of impairment. In addition, two 
or more moderate medical conditions may combine to create a substantially 
limiting condition. Thus, the following general rules should apply: (1) 
conditions not included in the regulation would carry no presumption 
regarding coverage or noncoverage, and the individual asserting 
discrimination under the ADA would have the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his or her impairment constituted a 
substantial limitation of a major life activity; (2) individuals whose condition 
fails to satisfy the published criteria can still establish coverage under the 
ADA by rebutting the presumption of noncoverage with a showing by clear 
and convincing evidence that their impairment constitutes a substantial 
limitation of a major life activity; and (3) employers may rebut the 
presumption of coverage of an individual whose medical condition satisfies 
the published criteria, by proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
impairment does not constitute a substantial limitation of a major life 
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activity. The heightened burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence188 
required to rebut either presumption is necessary to ensure that challenges to 
the presumptions are infrequently made and infrequently successful, so that 
the consistency of the rules is not undermined by routine judicial challenges. 
For impairments not covered by the regulation, as well as for individuals 
and employers contesting the presumption, the key to coverage would still 
depend on whether the impairment constituted a substantial limitation of a 
major life activity. This ‘substantial limitation of a major life activity’ 
language has proven difficult to apply. Therefore, Congress should also 
direct the EEOC to engage in additional rulemaking to clarify this term 
through vocational guidelines. The guidelines, developed with appropriate 
consultation with medical and rehabilitation specialists, would provide a list 
for each major life activity189 detailing when an impairment is substantially 
limiting. For example, the list might include inability to walk up one flight of 
stairs without serious shortness of breath, inability to stand or walk without 
assistance, inability to read or eat or use the telephone without assistive 
devices.  
The current regula tion includes “working” as a major life activity. 190 If 
the reforms urged in the proposal are adopted, working should be removed 
from the list of major life activities for the following three reasons. First, it is 
unnecessary. Individuals are substantially limited in their ability to work 
because of the presence of a physical or mental impairment (or a record of 
such an impairment or being regarded as having such an impairment). These 
impairments, as well as their effects on life activities, will be set out in detail 
in the new regulations.191 Second, clarity is one of the primary goals of the 
amendments proposed in this Article. A regulation could never set forth all of 
the criteria under which certain impairments are substantially limiting on a 
class of jobs. Thus, gaps in the regulations would add to the uncertainty and 
cost of litigation. Third, new technology increasingly will enable individuals 
 
 
 188. The clear and convincing standard is a heightened evidentiary burden in which a petitioner 
must show that “‘but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror, would have found the petitioner’ 
guilty.” See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 301 (1995) (quoting Sawyer v. Whitely, 505 U.S. 333, 336 
(1992)). 
 189. The EEOC Interpretive Guidance defines “major life activities” as “those basic activities that 
the average person in the general population with little or no difficulty. Major life activities include 
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, 
and working. The list is not exhaustive.” 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, App. (2000). 
 190. Id. 
 191. In Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002), the Supreme Court 
limited the usefulness of “working” as an independent major life activity by requiring proof that the 
individual’s impairment restricted the performance of daily activities “central to the most people’s . . . 
lives.” Id. at 693.  
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with very debilitating impairments to work productively. 192 Thus, the 
coverage determinations should focus on the effect of the impairment on the 
life functions of the individuals and not on their ability to work.  
The new rules regarding coverage of physical and mental impairments 
would not change the ADA’s general framework for statutory coverage of 
(1) individuals with a record of an impairment,193 (2) those regarded as 
having an impairment,194 and (3) those who associate with individuals with 
an impairment.195 The regulation, however, would offer guidance as to 
whether the impairment at issue satisfied the statutory criteria for 
disability.196 
The proposed amendment to the ADA would still cover individuals with 
“stigmatic” conditions. Thus, for example, an individual who was disfigured 
because of burns, but who was not otherwise limited in any major life 
activity, would remain covered under the ADA.197  
A major effect of the proposed amendment would be to require more 
cases to proceed to a factual determination of whether the individual, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, is able to perform the essential functions 
of the job safely and effectively. This next step raises the issues of 
“qualification standards” and the “direct threat” defense, additional areas of 
controversy under the ADA. 
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a “qualified individual with a 
disability.”198 Thus, it is essential to determine what it means to be 
“qualified.” According to section 101(8), the term means “an individual with 
 
 
 192. The theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking is profoundly impaired, yet able to work because 
of technological aids. The coverage under the ADA of an individual with comparable impairments 
should be based on the nature of the impairment and the effect of the impairment rather than on 
whether the impairment is a substantial limitation on the ability to work. 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994).  
 194. Id. § 12102(2)(C). 
 195. Id. § 12112(b)(4). 
 196. Establishing new lists for statutory coverage under the ADA raises the question as to how 
these lists relate to other criteria for “disability” already established under workers’ compensation or 
Social Security law. In Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp. , 526 U.S. 795 (1999), the Supreme Court 
held that claims for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits and ADA damages do not 
inherently conflict because “there are too many situations in which an SSDI claim and an ADA claim 
can comfortably exist side by side.” Id. at 802-03. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer held 
that the legal system should not impose a “negative presumption” against ADA and SSDI claims. Id. at 
802. “[W]e would not apply a special legal presumption permitting someone who has applied for, or 
received, SSDI benefits to bring an ADA suit only in ‘some limited and highly unusual set of 
circumstances.’” Id at 805 (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 
1997)). Accordingly, the proposed new amendments to the ADA would be separate from, and would 
not affect, claims for SSDI or workers’ compensation benefits. 
 197. See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 
35,742 (July 26, 1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2001). 
 198. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
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a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or 
desires.”199 Section 103(b) provides that “[t]he term ‘qualification standards’ 
may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to 
the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”200 Although this 
language is narrow and does not include harm to the individual employee 
with a disability, the interpretive regulation of the EEOC is broader.201 It 
defines “direct threat” to include the affected individual, requires these 
determinations to be made on the basis of reasonable medical judgment, and 
lists four factors to consider.202 The factors are “[t]he duration of the risk,” 
“[t]he nature and severity of the potential harm,” “[t]he likelihood that harm 
will occur,” and “[t]he imminence of the potential harm.”203  
EEOC’s interpretation has received mixed reviews in the courts. 
Although the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the EEOC that the direct threat 
defense applies where only the employee is endangered,204 the case with the 
most detailed discussion of the issue, decided by the Ninth Circuit, disagreed. 
In Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.,205 the employer denied an oil refinery 
job to the plaintiff, who was diagnosed with asymptomatic, chronic active 
hepatitis C, because the company believed that exposure to solvents and 
chemicals at the refinery would damage his liver. In reversing the district 
court’s granting of summary judgment for the defendant, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the direct threat defense was not available to the employer because 
only the plaintiff was at risk from exposure.206 
The court relied on the express language of the ADA and its legislative 
history’s consistent reference to the threat to “others” to reject the notion that 
the language of section 103(a) contained a drafting error.207 The court further 
 
 
 199. Id. § 12111(8). 
 200. Id. § 12113(b). 
 201. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2000). 
 202. Id. The EEOC interpretation seems to have corrected a congressional oversight in drafting 
the ADA, because under the ADA even a reckless or suicidal individual could not be denied 
employment as long as the individual was able to perform the essential functions of the job. Although 
there is plausible argument that the EEOC interpretation represents good policy, it is questionable 
whether the EEOC has the authority to adopt an interpretation that differs so clearly from the language 
of the ADA, especially in light of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).  
 203. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2000). 
 204. See Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996). See also LaChance v. 
Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835-36 (11th Cir. 1998) (dictum); EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 
F.3d 135, 146 (1st Cir. 1997) (dictum); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(dictum). 
 205. 226 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2001). 
 206. Id. at 1065. 
 207. Id. at 1066-67. 
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reasoned that Congress’s decision not to include threats to one’s own safety 
in the direct threat defense is consistent with the ADA’s prohibition against 
discrimination based on paternalism.208 In addition, the court stated that its 
interpretation was in accord with the Supreme Court’s Title VII cases 
prohibiting paternalistic employment policies.209 Finally, the court rejected 
the employer’s argument that, notwithstanding the direct threat defense, it 
could refuse to hire the plaintiff because he was not qualified for the job in 
that working without posing a threat to one’s own health or safety is an 
“essential function” of the job.210 
The court appears to have reached the right result using the wrong 
reasoning. The court observed, “There is no evidence that the health of [the 
plaintiff’s] liver ever affected his ability to do the job.”211 Therefore, even if 
the defendant could assert a direct threat defense, it could not prove it. The 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the case and will decide it during its 
2001-2002 term.212  
The direct threat defense, regardless of its scope, should apply only when 
the risk is immediate and severe. The legislative history of the ADA and the 
EEOC interpretation make it clear that a “direct threat” is difficult to prove. 
Patronizing assumptions, generalized fears, and speculative or remote risks 
are insufficient. The cases upholding a direct threat defense have involved 
public safety positions in fields such as transportation and health care, as well 
as positions that placed the individual workers in danger.213  
An example of a case in which the court rejected a “patronizing 
assumption” as a direct threat is Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Centers, 
Inc.214 Following a parent’s complaint that a teacher’s aide’s hearing 
impairment might place the children at risk, the school prohibited the aide 
from driving students in a van.215 The Fifth Circuit, in an en banc opinion, 
held that the employer failed to prove that the employee was a direct threat to 
 
 
 208. Id. at 1068. 
 209. Id. (citing International Unio n, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991), and 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)). 
 210. Id. at 1070. 
 211. Id. at 1072. 
 212. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 456 (2001). 
 213. See, e.g., Leonberger v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 231 F.3d 396, 399 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming summary judgment for employer of heavy machinery operator with sleep apnea); Kapche v. 
City of San Antonio, 176 F.3d 840, 847 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding issue of material fact whether police 
officer candidate with insulin-dependent diabetes posed direct threat when driving a vehicle); Estate of 
Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding HIV-infected health care 
worker posed a direct threat).  
 214. 213 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 215. Id. at 211. 
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the children.216 The court observed that the employee had an “unblemished 
history” of driving and supervising the children.217 
The direct threat defense would appear to be a narrower and more 
demanding subset of the broader defense that the individual lacked the 
necessary qualifications for the position. In EEOC v. Exxon Corp.,218 
however, the Fifth Circuit adopted a contrary interpretation. The court relied 
on section 103(a) of the ADA, which provides that qualification standards 
that “screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or a benefit to 
an individual” must be job-related and consistent with business necessity.219 
According to the court, “[A]n employer need not proceed under the direct 
threat provision . . . [in safety-based qualification cases] but rather may 
defend the standard as a business necessity.”220 The Fifth Circuit explained 
that the direct threat language only applies to individual risks and not to 
across-the-board standards.221 This result is questionable, in that a standard, if 
met, may legally disqualify a group of employees as a business necessity, but 
may not legally disqualify a single employee as a direct threat. Moreover, the 
court’s reliance on the general language of section 103(a) has the effect of 
nullifying the specific, direct threat provision, section 103(b).  
C. The Use of Medical Criteria Under Other Statutory Schemes  
Our proposed amendment envisions a regulatory scheme that departs 
from the current framework established under the Rehabilitation Act, the 
ADA, and state disability discrimination laws. Nevertheless, the general 
approach of using medical criteria to establish broad statutory presumptions 
is consistent with a large body of federal and state laws, including the Social 
Security Act and state workers’ compensation laws.  
1. Social Security Act  
The Social Security Act of 1935222 was one of the key pieces of 
legislation enacted during the New Deal. Its system of old age and survivors’ 
benefits played a major role in reducing poverty among the nation’s elderly 
 
 
 216. Id. at 213. 
 217. Id. at 213. 
 218. 203 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 219. Id. at 873 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)). 
 220. Id. at 875. 
 221. Id. at 873. 
 222. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1994). 
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population.223 In 1956, Title XVI of the Social Security Act was added to 
provide income replacement for qualified workers who become permanently 
and totally disabled.224 Since its inception, the program has grown 
tremendously, and as of 2000, annually pays more than three billion 
dollars225 to about four million people disabled workers.226  
The disability determination and appeals process is a massive 
bureaucracy. In fiscal year 1996, there were nearly two million claims 
filed,227 and over 540,000 of the denied claims went to a hearing before an 
administrative law judge.228 With such a huge number of cases to resolve, the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), now the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS), promulgated a series of regulations to 
simplify and standardize the process.229 Two types of regulations are 
particularly relevant to this discussion.  
An important part of determining whether a claimant is permanently and 
totally disabled is the medical question of the claimant’s condition. In 1980, 
the Secretary of HHS first published a Listing of Impairments,230 which 
“describes, for each of the major body systems, impairments that are 
considered severe enough to prevent an adult from doing any gainful 
activity.”231 The Listing of Impairments is divided into musculoskeletal 
system, special senses and speech, respiratory system, cardiovascular system, 
digestive system, genito-urinary system, hemic and lymphatic system, skin, 
endocrine system, multiple body systems, neurological, mental disorders, 
neoplastic diseases and malignancies, and immune system.232 The listings are 
regularly revised and updated.233 
Other important regulations interpret the Social Security Act’s provision 
to provide disability benefits only to individuals who are unable “to engage 
in any substantial gainful activity.”234 Prior to 1978, the Secretary of HHS 
relied on vocational experts to establish the existence of suitable jobs in the 
national economy based on the claimant’s abilities and limitations as 
 
 
 223. See MERTON C. BERNSTEIN & JOAN BRODSHAUG BERNSTEIN,  SOCIAL SECURITY: THE 
SYSTEM THAT WORKS 156 (1988). 
 224. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1994). 
 225. See SOCIAL SECURITY: BASIC FACTS, SSA Publication No. 05-10080, at 5 (Mar. 2000). 
 226. Id. 
 227. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CON., 1998 GREEN BOOK 48 
(Comm. Print 1998). 
 228. Id. 
 229. See, e.g ., 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404(p), App. 1 (2000); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404(p), App. 2 (2000). 
 230. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404(p), App. 1 (2000). 
 231. 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(a) (2000). 
 232. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404(p), App. 1 (2000). 
 233. Id. 
 234. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)(A) (1994). 
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adduced at the hearing. To improve both the uniformity and efficiency of the 
adjudications, the Secretary promulgated medical-vocational guidelines as 
part of the 1978 regulations.235 The regulations contain a detailed grid based 
on the claimant’s age, education, and previous work experience to determine 
the individual’s work capability. 236 In general, older, less educated, and less 
skilled individuals are more likely to be considered permanently and totally 
disabled.237 In Heckler v. Campbell,238 the Supreme Court upheld the 
medical-vocational guidelines. According to the Court, “This type of general 
factual issue may be resolved as fairly through rulemaking as by introducing 
the testimony of vocational experts at each disability hearing.”239 
2. Workers’ Compensation Laws  
Although the workers’ compensation law of each state is different, most 
state systems are similar in structure. They provide for medical expenses and 
a percentage of lost wages as compensation for workers whose injuries and 
illnesses occurred during the course and scope of their employment.240 
Benefits are based on the nature and duration of the worker’s incapacity and 
are classified as temporary partial, temporary total, permanent partial, and 
permanent total.241 Death benefits also are provided to the heirs of workers 
who die from work-related injuries and illnesses.242 
In all but a few jurisdictions, by statute, awards for permanent partial 
disability are based on “scheduled” benefits.243 Typically, the laws provide 
that after workers have reached their maximum medical improvement from 
an injury, the permanent effects of the impairment are based on a published 
table.244 Statutorily established benefits are awarded for the worker’s loss of 
an arm, hand, thumb, first finger, second finger, third finger, fourth finger, 
leg, foot, great toe, other toes, one eye, hearing in one ear, and hearing in 
both ears.245 The purpose of these tables is to regularize and simplify awards 
 
 
 235. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569 (2000). 
 236. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404(p), App. 2 (2000). 
 237. Id. 
 238. 461 U.S. 458, 468 (1983). 
 239. Id. See also  Rachel Schneider, A Role for the Courts: Treating Physician Evidence in Social 
Security Determinations, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH.  ROUNDTABLE 391, 394-95 (1996) (noting that the Court 
found that medical-vocational guidelines protect against arbitrary decision making, and that 
determining claims on a case-by-case basis would overburden the courts with unnecessary litigation). 
 240. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.10 (1984).  
 241. Id. § 80.03. 
 242. Id. § 1.10. 
 243. Id. § 52. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. § 52.10. 
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for each listed condition. 246 These provisions have been upheld against a 
variety of legal challenges. For example, in Gilleland v. Armstrong Rubber 
Co.,247 the claimant asserted that the scheduled injury provisions of the Iowa 
Workers’ Compensation Law violated the equal protection guarantees of the 
United States and Iowa Constitutions because nonscheduled permanent 
partial disabilities were compensated by the industrial disability method, 
which takes into account the loss of earning capacity. The Supreme Court of 
Iowa rejected the argument and upheld the statute.248 The court held that the 
law had a rational basis in that it “reduce[d] controversies through certainty 
of compensation.”249 
3. Other Federal and State Statutes 
a. Black Lung Benefits Act 
The Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA)250 provides another example of 
Congress’s use of medical criteria to establish presumptive categories. 
Congress enacted the law to compensate American coal miners who 
contracted pneumoconiosis arising out of their work in coal mines.251 Under 
a section entitled “Claims for Benefits Filed on or Before December 31, 
1973,” the Act lists explicit medical criteria that create rebuttable or 
irrebutable presumptions that the miner’s pneumoconiosis was employment-
related or caused the death or disability. 252 For instance, if a miner who 
suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed for over ten years in a coal 
mine, the Act establishes a rebuttable presumption that the condition arose 
out of such employment.253 The courts have granted broad deference to 
BLBA enforcement, and it has withstood numerous constitutional attacks.254 
In Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation 
Programs, United States Department of Labor,255 the Supreme Court 
interpreted the “interim presumption” of eligibility for black lung benefits as 
requiring that a claimant establish at least one qualifying fact by a 
 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. 524 N.W.2d 404, 406-07 (Iowa 1994).  
 248. Id. at 408. 
 249. Id. at 407.  
 250. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994). 
 251. Id. § 901(a). 
 252. Id. § 92l. 
 253. Id. § 921(c)(1). 
 254. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 6 (1976). 
 255. 484 U.S. 135, 138 (1987). 
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preponderance of the evidence.256 In order to be eligible for BLBA benefits, 
potential claimants must prove—usually with medical testimony—that 
pneumoconiosis caused a miner’s death or disability.257 Upon such a 
showing, a claimant establishes statutory complicated pneumoconiosis and 
invokes the irrebuttable presumption under the BLBA.258 
b. State “Heart and Lung” Laws 
Over half the states have enacted “heart and lung” provisions in their 
workers’ compensation laws.259 Heart and lung statutes create “an irrebutable 
presumption that any cardiovascular or respiratory impairment suffered by a 
firefighter [(and depending on the jurisdiction, police officers and other 
public employees)] is work-related.”260 States enacted these statutes as a 
fringe benefit for firefighters and to solve the causation problem of proving 
that an impairment is work rela ted where the individuals’ work exposed them 
to many types of gases, vapors, and smoke.261 As the Ninth Circuit 
 
 
 256. Under the Department of Labor’s interim regulations governing black lung benefit claims 
filed between July 1, 1973, and April 1, 1980, a claimant was initially presumptively eligible for 
disability benefits if “the claimant who engaged in coal mine employment for at least 10 years” proved 
one of the following medical criteria: “(1) a chest X ray establish[ing] the presence pneumoconiosis; 
(2) ventilatory studies establish[ing] the presence of [any] respiratory or pulmonary disease . . . of a 
specified severity; (3) blood gas studies demonstrat[ing] . . . an impairment in the transfer of oxygen 
from the lungs to the blood; or (4) other medical evidence, including the documented opinion of a 
physician exercising reasonable medical judgment, establish[ing] . . . a totally disabling respiratory 
impairment.” 484 U.S. at 141-42. 
 257. See Brown v. Rock Creek Mining Co., 996 F.2d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 1993). But cf. Runyon v. 
E. Coal Corp., 229 F.3d. 1153, 2000 WL 1140725, at *1 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) 
(denying petition for review of ALJ decision denying benefits under the BLBA because claimant did 
not offer expert testimony, and hospital records did not show, that pneumoconiosis, rather than 
pneumonia, caused a miner’s death). 
 258. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Dir., O.W.C.P., United States Dep’t of Labor, 220 F.3d 250, 255 
(4th Cir. 2000). 
 259. See Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public 
Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 940, 952 (1987). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 952-53. See also Take v. Comm’r, 804 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1986). In addition to 
firefighters, heart and lung stat utes often include police officers and other public employees. ALA. 
CODE  § 11-43-144 (Supp. 2001) (firefighters); CAL.  LAB.  CODE §§ 3212, 3212.2, 3212.5 (1989) 
(police, sheriff’s office, district attorney’s staff of inspectors or investigators, firefighters, game 
wardens, corrections employees, state hospital security, youth authority); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.18, 
185.34 (West 2000) (firefighters, police); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.2581 (West 1988) (firefighters); 
MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 9-503 (1999) (police, firefighters); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, 
§ 94 (West Supp. 2001) (police, firefighters, corrections officers, crash crews at Logan Airport); MICH . 
COMP . LAWS ANN. § 418.405 (West 1999) (police, firefighters); MINN.  STAT.  ANN. § 176.011.15 
(West 1993) (police, firefighters, conservation officers, department of natural resources forest 
officers); MO. REV. STAT. § 87.005 (2000) (firefighters); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-1723 (1997) (police, 
firefighters); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 207-k (McKinney 1999) (police, firefighters); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 65-01-15.1 (Supp. 2001) (police, firefighters); OHIO REV.  CODE ANN. § 4123.68(W) (West 2001) 
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explained: “Presumptions provide a shortcut to recovery by weakening the 
quantum of proof needed to recover. Instead of having to prove the ultimate 
fact of causation, the worker may prove certain basic facts from which 
causation will be presumed.”262 
c. Medical Standards for Workers 
In addition to the federal and state laws establishing legal presumptions 
based on medical criteria, a variety of other laws utilize medical standards for 
workers or authorize regulatory bodies to do so. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Act263 and the Mine Safety and Health Act264 require medical 
examinations of employees with exposure to certain toxic substances. In 
addition, the definition of “serious health condition” under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act265 is established by medical criteria.266  
The Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Bureau of Motor Carrier 
Safety has issued detailed regulations for the physical examination of drivers 
operating motor vehicles in interstate commerce.267 Successful completion of 
the examination is a prerequisite to driver certification.268 Physicians are 
provided with a form and instructions about specific conditions to 
evaluate.269 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has promulgated similar 
regulations for airline flight crews.270 Unlike the Motor Carrier examinations, 
which may be performed by any licensed physician, aviation medical 
examinations may be performed only by physicians designated by the FAA 
under the auspices of the Federal Air Surgeon.271 
The DOT and FAA examinations contemplate a role for physicians that is 
different from their role in other examinations. Because of concern for public 
safety, these agencies have adopted detailed procedures and standards that 
 
 
(police, firefighters); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 49-110 (West 1994) (firefighters); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 656.802(4) (West Supp. 1998) (firefighters); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-11-30 (Law. Co-op. 1985) 
(firefighters); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-51-201(a)(1), (b)(1) (1998) (law enforcement officials, 
firefighters); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 601(11)(C), (E) (Supp. 2001) (police, firefighters); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 891.45 (West Supp. 2001) (firefighters). 
 262. Take, 804 F.2d at 557.  
 263. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994). 
 264. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1994). 
 265. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (2001). 
 266. See Miller v. AT&T, 250 F.3d 820, 825 (4th Cir. 2001).  
 267. 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b) (2000). 
 268. 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(a). 
 269. 49 C.F.R. § 391.43. 
 270. 14 C.F.R. Pt. 67 (2000). 
 271. 14 C.F.R. § 67.405. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p243 Rothstein book pages.doc  8/5/2002   5:58 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
282 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:243 
 
 
 
 
remove a great deal of the physician’s discretion. If the standards are 
excessively stringent and serve to disqualify individuals who would normally 
be considered fit, policymakers consider these disqualifications to be an 
acceptable price to pay for protecting the public. 
A number of state laws also require preemployment medical 
examinations to protect public health and safety. Among the occupations for 
which a medical examination may be mandated are teachers, school bus 
drivers, meat and poultry workers, police, firefighters, and transportation 
workers.272 The laws vary widely in the degree of specificity in the medical 
standards.  
V. PROPOSED MEDICAL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING COVERAGE 
UNDER THE ADA 
The following section is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of using 
medical criteria to address the severity of common disabling conditions. It is 
not intended as a substantive proposal of the actual medical criteria for the 
various conditions. Such determinations would be the subject of the 
rulemaking contemplated by the proposed amendment to the ADA. 
A. Arthritis 
Arthritis, the most commonly reported affliction in the United States, has 
no known cure. It is a degenerative process manifested by pain, swelling, and 
deformity of the joints and decreased joint mobility. 273 Occasionally, pain 
can occur even without loss of motion. 274 Any of the movable joints of the 
body can be involved, but the joints of the hand, wrist, and hip are most 
noticeable and debilitating. 275 
Steroids are the main form of treatment, but surgery is considered when 
joint deformity is incapacitating.276 The long-term use of steroids can result 
 
 
 272. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS 40 
(1989). 
 273. Daniel J. McCarthy, Differential Diagnosis of Arthritis: Analysis of Signs and Symptoms, in 
ARTHRITIS AND ALLIED CONDITIONS: A TEXTBOOK OF RHEUMATOLOGY 39, 40 (William J. Koopman 
ed., 2001). 
 274. Robert H. Haralson III, Current American Medical Association Techniques fo r Assessing 
Musculoskeletal Impairment and Maximum Medical Improvement, in OCCUPATIONAL 
MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS: FUNCTION, OUTCOME AND EVIDENCE 685, 694 (Tom G. Mayer et 
al. eds., 2000).  
 275. WALTER B. GREENE, ESSENTIALS OF MUSCULOSKELETAL CARE  200, 315 (2d ed. 2001). 
 276. Id. at 52. 
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in systemic problems, including hypertension, increased levels of cholesterol, 
and weight gain.277 
Depression secondary to inactivity occurs frequently in individuals with 
arthritis.278 This is most common when individuals no longer can enjoy 
social and recreational activities.279 Because of the progressive nature of 
arthritis, individuals afflicted should be considered as having a disability 
when they have the following limitations: 
1. Necessity of special, medically accepted and prescribed 
mechanical devices; or 
2. Necessity of substantial personal assistance for activities of daily 
living; or 
3. Total dependency for any activity. 
B. Asthma 
Asthma is a reactive airways disease that may be triggered by a variety of 
stimuli in the environment or by internal causes, such as inflammatory 
changes of the tracheobronchial tree.280 It is a chronic disorder that causes 
recurrent and distressing episodes of wheezing, breathlessness, chest 
tightness, and nighttime or early morning coughing.281 Asthma can be 
difficult to diagnose and differentiate from other respiratory illnesses. 
Approximately 5 million persons, or seven percent of those under age 
eighteen, are affected with asthma.282 
Individuals with asthma have symptoms associated with airway 
obstruction, such as shortness of breath, wheezing, and cardiovascular 
abnormalities.283 Risk factors for life-threatening exacerbation of asthma 
include a history of severe asthma, poorly controlled asthma of any severity, 
major external allergic precipitators, psychological factors, and the daily use 
of corticosteroids.284 Prior hospitalization for asthma and a history of use of 
 
 
 277. Id. 
 278. Patricia P. Katz & Edward H. Yelin, Activity Loss and the Onset of Depressive Symptoms, 44 
ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 1194, 1194 (2001). 
 279. Id. 
 280. E. R. McFadden Jr., Asthma, in HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1419, 1419 
(Anthony S. Fauci et al. eds., 14th ed. 1998) [hereinafter HARRISON’S]. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Elizabeth Jack et al., Asthma: A Speaker’s Kit for Public Health Officials, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/airpollution/asthma/speakit/ (visited Nov. 7, 2001). 
 283. McFadden, supra  note 280, at 1419. 
 284. See Patrick A. Hessel et al., Risk Factors for Death from Asthma, 83 ANNALS OF ALLERGY, 
ASTHMA & IMMUNOLOGY 362 (1999). 
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mechanical ventilation for asthma increase the likelihood of future 
hospitalization. 285  
In order to target persons with serious conditions, individuals with asthma 
should be considered as having a disability if they require daily use of 
corticosteroids in excess of ten milligrams for at least three months or have a 
history of hospitalization for asthma treatment that included placement of an 
endotracheal tube and use of mechanical ventilation within the preceding 
twenty-four months. 
C. Bipolar I Mood Disorder 
A mood disorder is a primary disorder of an emotional state that is not 
secondary to some physical or psychological state.286 It is “characterized by a 
pathologically elevated or depressed mood,” or both—a condition that can 
affect all aspects of a person’s life.287  
Bipolar I disorder is diagnosed in about one percent of psychiatric 
disorders.288 The diagnosis is based on a past or present history of a manic 
episode that may be a single episode or recurrent episodes separated by two 
months without symptoms.289 In about sixty percent of the cases, a 
depressive episode comes immediately before or after the manic phase.290 
A manic episode can be manifested in several ways, all of which are 
considered abnormal in the person affected. These manifestations include an 
elevated or irritated mood, increased distractibility, racing thoughts, inflated 
self esteem, pressured speech, excessive money spending, and decreased 
need for sleep.291 
Medicine has not yet determined the etiology of bipolar disorder. 
Treatment for the disorder is pharmacotherapy, most commonly with 
antidepressants.292 Even with treatment, only about eighteen percent of those 
 
 
 285. Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration Clinical Practice Guidelines 
for Management of COPD or Asthma, available at http://www.va.gov/health/pulmonary/clin_prac 
(visited Nov. 7, 2001). 
 286. HAROLD I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADACK , SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY  525 (8th ed. 1998). 
 287. Victor I. Reus, Mood Disorders, in REVIEW OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY  263, 263 (Howard H. 
Goldman ed., 2000).  
 288. HAROLD I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADACK , SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY  525 (8th ed. 1998). 
 289. Id. at 547.  
 290. P.T. Loosen et al., Mood Disorders, in CURRENT DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY 
290, 314 (M.H. Ebert et al., eds., 2000). 
 291. ALEX KOLEVZON & DAPHNE SIMEON , PSYCHIATRY ESSENTIALS: A SYSTEMIC REVIEW 15 
(2002).  
 292. JERALD KAY &  ALLAN TASMAN,  PSYCHIATRY :  BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND CLINICAL 
ESSENTIALS 339 (2000). 
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with the disorder are well without relapses.293 Seven percent remain 
chronically ill, often requiring hospitalization and supervision because of the 
possibility of causing harm to others.294 
Persons afflicted with bipolar I disorder should be considered disabled if 
they have: 
1. Ongoing medical treatment for a confirmed diagnosis of bipolar I 
disorder; or 
2. A history of hospitalization for bipolar I disorder. 
D. Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) or chronic 
bronchitis/emphysema is a chronic disabling condition of the lungs, most 
often due to cigarette smoking295 and resulting in varying proportions of 
alveolar destruction (emphysema) and bronchiolar fibrosis (obstructive 
bronchitis).296 Inflammation and eventually loss of functional lung tissue 
create progressive difficulty with entry of oxygen and removal of carbon 
dioxide from the blood. An estimated fifteen million Americans are affected 
with this disease, comprising a spectrum of symptoms ranging from cough, 
sputum production, dyspnea, and airflow limitation.297 Patients with 
advanced disease are impaired with primary restrictions on physical activity 
due to shortness of breath resulting from a low blood oxygen level. They 
may also suffer from heart disease, especially that involving the right side of 
the heart, leading to corpulmonale or failure of the right ventricle.298 Patients 
with COPD are also at much greater risk for complications and death 
resulting from respiratory infections such as influenza and pneumonia.299 
A variety of oral and inhaled medications may be used to treat symptoms, 
but for persons with advanced disease and substantial lowering of the blood 
oxygen content, oxygen may be needed on a frequent or continuous basis.300 
 
 
 293. Michael J. Gitlin et al., Relapse and Impairment in Bipolar Disorder, 152 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1635, 1639 (1995). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Greg T. Ferguson & Reuben M. Cherniack, Current Concepts: Management of Chronic 
Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1017, 1017 (1993). 
 296. Sherwood Burge, Should Inhaled Corticosteroids Be Used in the Long Term Treatment of 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease?, 61 DRUGS 1535, 1535 (2001). 
 297. Ferguson & Cherniack, supra note 295, at 1017. 
 298. Eric G. Honig & Roland H. Ingram Jr., Chronic Bronchitis, Emphysema, and Airways 
Obstruction , in HARRISON’S supra note 280, at 1451, 1455. 
 299. Id. at 1452. 
 300. Burge, supra note 296, at 1537, 1543. 
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Long-term oxygen therapy, supplied through the use of external devices, is 
the only widely accepted ongoing therapy for COPD; while it does not slow 
disease progression, it does lengthen the lives of hypoxic patients.301 
Mortality from COPD is reduced in patients with chronic hypoxemia when 
oxygen is administered for at least twelve hours daily, extending a patient’s 
life span by up to six or seven years.302 The Department of Veterans Affairs 
standard requirement for the initiation of supplementary oxygen is a partial 
pressure of oxygen in the peripheral arteries of less than fifty-five millimeters 
(mm.) of mercury or an arterial oxygen saturation of less than ninety 
percent.303 
Severe COPD may require the use of oral corticosteroids to control 
symptoms. While these drugs may be highly effective, they also confer major 
toxicity that may limit their use.304  
Patients with COPD should be considered to have a disability if they: 
1. Are on continuous oxygen administration for at least twelve hours 
a day due to an underlying PaO2 of less than fifty-five mm. of 
mercury, or less than sixty mm. with signs of tissue hypoxia, or due to 
an arterial oxygen saturation of less than ninety percent; or 
2. If they require daily use of corticosteroids in excess of ten m.g. for 
at least three months.  
E. Congestive Heart Failure 
Congestive heart failure affects approximately five million Americans, 
and approximately 550,000 individuals develop new onset heart failure each 
year.305 In 2001, 960,000 patients with heart failure were hospitalized and 
287,200 of them died.306 Eighty percent of male and seventy percent of 
female congestive heart failure patients under the age of sixty-five die within 
eight years after onset of symptoms.307 Coronary artery disease is the most 
 
 
 301. Id. at 1537. 
 302. Department of Veterans Affairs, VHA Clinical Practice Guidelines for the Management of 
COPD or Asthma, Outpatient Management of COPD: Long-term Oxygen Therapy, available at 
http://www.va.gov/health/pulmonary/clin_prac (visited Nov. 7, 2001). 
 303. Id. 
 304. D.S. Postma et al., Severe Chronic Airflow Obstruction: Can Corticosteroids Slow Down 
Progression?, 67 EUR. J. RESPIRATORY DISEASES 56, 63 (1985). 
 305. American Heart Association, Understanding Heart Failure, available at 
http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=1593. 
 306. American Stroke Association and American Heart Association, 2002 Heart and Stroke 
Statistical Update, available at http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jtml?identifier=1593. 
 307. Id. 
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common cause of congestive heart failure.308 
The New York Heart Association (NYHA) classification system has been 
developed to characterize the degree of disability associated with congestive 
heart failure. NYHA Class I represents asymptomatic individuals; NYHA 
Class II to IIIa, symptomatic individuals; Class IIIb, a symptomatic 
individual with recent shortness of breath at rest; and Class IV, individuals 
having persistent shortness of breath at rest.309 
The assessment of functional capacity in patients with congestive heart 
failure is of critical importance because it measures the direct effect of the 
condition on the patient’s well-being, quality of life, and cognitive 
function.310 Functional capacity is a major predictor of mortality in patients 
with congestive heart failure.311 Though laboratory tests can be utilized, 
asking about the patient’s ability to engage in common daily activities can 
provide an important method of assessing functional capacity.312 
Determination of tolerance for well-defined activities, such as walking a 
specified distance on level ground or climbing one to two flights of stairs, is 
particularly helpful and is frequently substituted for formal laboratory 
measures.313 
Individuals with congestive heart symptoms should be considered as 
having a disability if they are diagnosed with New York Heart Association 
Class III or Class IV congestive heart failure. 
F. Diabetes Mellitus 
Diabetes mellitus is a chronic condition caused by primary failure of the 
pancreas to secrete insulin or by resistance of peripheral tissues to the action 
of insulin. A total of 15.7 million Americans, or about six percent of the 
population, have diabetes, with 5.4 million of them having as-yet 
undiagnosed disease.314 Some 800,000 new cases occur each year.315  
 
 
 308. University of Michigan Heart Failure Guideline Team, Heart Failure—Systolic Dysfunction: 
Guidelines for Clinical Care, National Guideline Clearinghouse, Aug. 1999, available at 
http://ome.med.umich.edu/pdf/guideline/heart.pdf. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Osvaldo P. Almeida & Sérgio Tamai, Congestive Heart Failure and Cognitive Function 
Amongst Older Adults, 59 ARQUIVOS DE NEURO -PSIQUIATRIA 324, 324 (2001). 
 311. James C. Coyne et al., Prognostic Importance of Marital Quality for Survival of Congestive 
Heart Failure, 88 AM J. CARDIOLOGY 526, 528 (2001); American College of Cardiology & American 
Heart Association Task Force on Practice Guidelines, Guidelines for the Evaluation and Management 
of Heart Failure, 26 J. AM. C. OF CARDIOLOGY 1376, 1386 (1995).  
 312. Id. 
 313. Id.  
 314. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Diabetes Fact Sheet, Nov. 1, 1998, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/facts98.htm 
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Long-term clinical complications of diabetes include the following: 
· Heart disease—the most common cause of diabetes-related 
deaths; 
· Stroke—with a risk two to four times higher than in 
nondiabetics; 
· Hypertension—affecting sixty-five percent of diabetics; 
· Kidney disease—in which diabetes is the most prevalent cause 
of end-stage renal disease, leading to about forty percent of 
new cases; 
· Nervous system disease—approximately sixty-five percent of 
individuals with diabetes have some type of nervous system 
damage (often including pain or impaired sensation in the 
feet or hands, slowed digestion, and carpal tunnel syndrome); 
· Amputations—diabetes is associated with over half of all U.S. 
lower limb amputations.316 
More extensive types of amputations lead to greater physical impairment. 
Specifically, patients with transtibial amputations have significantly 
increased disability compared to those with midfoot or toe amputations.317 
Important precursor lesions that may ultimately result in amputation are 
chronic foot ulcers. The loss of mobility associated with foot ulcers reduces 
the ability to perform routine tasks; about half of the affected patients cannot 
work and the other half experience reduced productivity or delayed career 
advancement.318  
Diabetic complications causing severe morbidity and premature mortality 
appear on average about fifteen to twenty years after the first clinical 
evidence of hyperglycemia.319 For this reason, those with juvenile onset 
diabetes will most often develop complications at an earlier age than those 
with adult onset disease. One of the most feared complications is visual 
impairment. Proliferative retinopathy is a precursor lesion to severe visual 
 
 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Edgar J.G. Peters et al., Functional Status of Persons with Diabetes-related Lower-extremity 
Amputations, 24 DIABETES CARE 1799, 1800-01 (2001). 
 318. Loretta Vileikyte, Diabetic Foot Ulcers: A Quality of Life Issue, 17 DIABETES METABOLISM 
RESEARCH REVS. 246, 247 (2001). 
 319. Daniel W. Foster, Diabetes Mellitus, in HARRISON’S, supra  note 280, at 2060, 2074.  
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loss; about half of the patients with this disorder become blind within five 
years; the preferred treatment for this disorder is laser photocoagulation.320  
Individuals with diabetes should be considered as having a disability if 
any of the following apply: 
1. Diagnosis of juvenile-onset, insulin-requiring diabetes mellitus; or 
2. Adult-onset diabetes mellitus with any of the following: 
a. Laser treatment for diabetic retinopathy, or 
b. Chronic ulcerations of the lower extremity, or 
c. Amputation at the ankle or below for peripheral vascular 
disease or chronic lower extremity ulcers, or 
d. Renal failure requiring hemodialysis or kidney 
transplantation or a Karnofsky Index score of less than seventy.  
G. Epilepsy 
Epilepsy comprises a spectrum of disorders characterized by recurrent 
seizures resulting from a chronic underlying process. Epilepsy affects about 
2.3 million Americans.321 People of all ages are affected, especially the very 
young and the elderly. The most severe form of epilepsy is the generalized 
tonic-clonic seizure, commonly known as a grand mal seizure.322 This 
seizure is manifested by “loss of consciousness[,] . . . a sequence of motor 
events that includes widespread tonic muscle contraction evolving to clonic 
jerking[,] . . . [generalized] clinical and electroencephalographic 
manifestations[,] . . . and [post-seizure] metabolic and behavioral 
suppression.”323  
Persons affected by epilepsy experience a substantially reduced quality of 
life. Even with therapy, complete control is obtained in only sixty percent of 
people with tonic-clonic seizures.324 Anti-epileptic drugs are the most 
common form of treatment, with surgery being reserved for persons 
refractive to medical therapy.325 
 
 
 320. Id. at 2075. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Bruce J. Fisch & Piotr W. Olejniczak, Generalized Tonic-Clonic Seizures, in THE 
TREATMENT OF EPILEPSY  369, 369-70 (Elaine Wyllie ed., 3d ed. 2000). 
 323. Id. at 369. 
 324. Id. at 387. 
 325. Id. 
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A person with epilepsy should be considered as disabled under the ADA 
if he or she demonstrates: 
1. A history of one generalized tonic-clonic seizure; or  
2. The individual has been on medication for at least one year for 
seizure control. 
H. Hearing Impairments 
After lower back pain, hearing impairment is the second most common 
physical disability in the United States.326 In adults, hearing loss represents 
the third most common self-reported health problem among Americans sixty-
five and older, after arthritis and hypertension.327 It has been estimated that 
there are over twenty-eight million Americans either deaf or hearing 
impaired.328 By 2020, it is expected that the number will be about forty 
million.329 
In considering hearing loss, there is no clearly accepted decibel threshold 
or speech discrimination level beyond which a disability is established.330 At 
one end of the hearing loss spectrum is the individual with no effective 
hearing who is a candidate for an implanted electronic device designed to 
restore the ability to detect sound.331 For such a person to be approved for an 
implant, the United States Food and Drug Administration requires only that 
the hearing impairment be so great that it is not correctable by conventional 
methods of amplification.332 Disability is not a consideration for candidacy 
for an implant. 
Below this extreme, however, some individuals are disabled by their 
inability to hear or to understand conversational speech even though the 
decibel levels of frequencies tested might indicate only a moderate hearing 
loss, or one less than sixty decibels.333 Although amplification can increase 
the awareness of environmental sounds, it is ineffective for improving the 
 
 
 326. Jack A. Shohet & Thomas Bent, Hearing Loss: The Invisible Disability, 104 POSTGRAD. 
MED. 49 (1998). 
 327. ROBERT A. DOBIE, MEDICAL-LEGAL EVALUATION OF HEARING LOSS 128 (1993). 
 328. BARBARA E. WEINSTEIN, GERIATRIC AUDIOLOGY 81 (2000).  
 329. DOBIE, supra note 327, at 87. 
 330. Id.  
 331. GEORGE T. MENCHER ET AL ., AUDIOLOGY AND AUDITORY DYSFUNCTION 250 (1997). 
 332. John K. Niparko, Assessment of Cochlear Implant Candidacy, in COCHLEAR IMPLANTS: 
PRINCIPLES & P RACTICES 173, 175 (John K. Niparko et al. eds., 2000). 
 333. Jack Katz & Thomas P. White, Introduction to the Handicap of Hearing Impairment, in 
AURAL REHABILITATION 19, 26 (Raymond H. Hull 3d ed. 1997). 
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ability to differentiate and understand what is spoken.334 
The quality of sound obtained through amplification is inconsistent 
among individuals. Often, a person who theoretically should be helped with a 
hearing aid finds the sounds produced uncomfortable and will not wear the 
aid, even after making a considerable financial investment in it.335 Even 
when individuals with hearing impairment do benefit from amplification, 
they might not be able to wear a hearing aid on a consistent basis, either 
because of their work environment, which might be hot or humid, or because 
of chronic ear infections. 
Individuals with moderate to severe hearing loss should be considered 
disabled if their hearing loss fits into one of the following categories: 
1. Unaided pure tone average of 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 hertz 
frequencies of 50 decibels or greater in the better hearing ear; or 
2. Word understanding of fifty percent or less on open-set 
monosyllabic testing at fifty decibels in the better hearing ear. 
I. Malignancy 
The disability of a person with a malignancy is related to both the disease 
itself and to the treatment. Because untreated malignancies progress to 
metastasis and eventual death, treatment is essential.336 
As a tumor increases in size or spreads to a different location, the 
treatment required to control the tumor increases in complexity and the side 
effects multiply. Those treatments with proven efficacy include surgery, 
radiation therapy, and chemotherapy.337 Each has side effects, many chronic 
or permanent. Surgery can result in chronic pain, disfigurement, or motor or 
sensory nerve deficits. Radiation burns the skin and deep tissues causing pain 
and inflammation of mucous membranes. Chemotherapy is toxic and can 
result in bone marrow depression, loss of hair, and chronic nausea. 
When the tumor is large or spreads throughout the body, multimodality 
treatment is commonly used, wherein two or more treatment modalities are 
 
 
 334. Id. 
 335. Michael M. Popelka et al., Low Prevalence of Hearing Aid Use Among Older Adults with 
Hearing Loss: The Epidemiology of Hearing Loss Study , 46 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1075, 1077 
(1998).  
 336. Leonard Weiss, Metastasis of Cancer: A Conceptual History from Antiquity to the 1990s, 19 
CANCER & METASTASIS REVS. 193, 321 (2000). 
 337. Emil J. Freireich, Can We Conquer Cancer in the Twenty-First Century?, 48 CANCER 
CHEMOTHERAPY & PHARMACOLOGY (Supp.) (2001), available at http://link.springer.de/link/service/ 
journals/00280/contents/01/00298/paper/s002800100298ch110.html. 
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used together, such as a combination of surgery and chemotherapy. This 
results in more disabling side effects. In addition to the effects of treatment, 
the malignancy itself can cause long-term depression338 and severe bodily 
fatigue.339 
In cases where no effective treatment is available, or when the burdens of 
treatment outweigh the benefits, palliative care is given for the comfort of the 
patient.340 
The following persons should be considered as having a disability: 
1. Any person who has undergone multimodality treatment within the 
past three years; or 
2. Any person with a diagnosis of metastatic disease; or 
3. Any person with recurrent malignancy, except primary malignancy 
of the skin; or 
4. Any person who has received ongoing chemotherapy for over one 
year; or 
5. Any person with a diagnosis of malignancy for which there is no 
effective standard beneficial therapy. 
J. Multiple Sclerosis 
Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a disorder that results from inflammation in the 
central nervous system, causing loss of myelin and scar tissue formation.341 
MS affects approximately 350,000 Americans.342 Next to trauma, MS is the 
second leading cause of neurologic disability beginning in early to middle 
adulthood.343  
The manifestations of MS are quite variable, ranging from a relatively 
benign illness to a progressively debilitating disease.344 Complications of the 
disorder affect several body systems and require major adjustments both by 
 
 
 338. J. Rob J. de Leeuw et al., Predictors of Depression 6 Months to 3 Years After Treatment of 
Head and Neck Cancer, 23 HEAD & NECK 892, 892 (2001). 
 339. Charles S. Cleeland, Cancer-Related Fatigue: New Directions for Research , 92 CANCER 
(Supp.) 1657, 1657 (2001). 
 340. David J. Roy & Neil MacDonald, Ethical Issues in Palliative Care, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK 
OF PALLIATIVE MEDICINE 97, 114-17 (Derek Doyle et al. eds., 1998). 
 341. Stephan L. Hauser & Donald E. Goodkin, Multiple Sclerosis and Other Demyelinating 
Diseases, in HARRISON’S, supra note 280, at 2409, 2409. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
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patients and their families. Its clinical manifestations are varied. Generally, 
the first symptoms are limb weakness, blurred vision due to optic neuritis, 
disturbance of the sensory system, double vision, and incoordination. 345  
The most widely used measure of neurologic impairment and disability in 
MS is known as the Kurtzke Expanded Disability Status Scale (EDSS).346 
This score, which ranges from zero to ten, represents a composite of 
pyramidal, cerebellar, brainstem, sensory, bladder/bowel, visual, and mental 
function subscales.347 Individuals are considered to be moderately disabled if 
their score is in the 4-6 range.348 Because of the debility due to incontinence, 
bladder and bowel dysfunction are important independent measures of 
impairment due to MS.349 
Individuals with MS should be considered as having a disability if they 
have: 
1. A Kurtzke EDSS score of greater than or equal to 5.0; or 
2. Urinary or fecal incontinence; or 
3. Visual impairment qualifying independently for inclusion. 
K. Renal Failure 
End-stage renal disease (ESRD) or kidney failure due to any of a variety 
of diseases can result in severe disability and risk of death. Hypertension and 
diabetes account for almost two-thirds of new cases.350 Mortality in the end-
stage renal disease population remains high. At age forty-nine, the expected 
survival is seven years, as opposed to approximately thirty years for a person 
 
 
 345. Id. at 2411.  
 346. Monica W. Nortvedt et al., Quality of Life in Multiple Sclerosis: Measuring the Disease 
Effects More Broadly, 53 NEUROLOGY 1098, 1098 (1999). See also Donald G. Brunet et al., 
Measurement of Health -related Quality of Life in Multiple Sclerosis Patients, 23 CAN. J. 
NEUROLOGICAL SCIS. 99, 99 (1996). 
 347. Stephan L. Hauser & Donald E. Goodkin, supra note 343, at 2416.  
 348. N. Murphy et al., Quality of Life in Multiple Sclerosis in France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom , 65 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & P SYCHIATRY 460, 461 (1998). 
 349. H. Ford et al., Health Status and Quality of Life of People with Multiple Sclerosis, 23 
DISABILITY &  REHAB. 516, 520 (2001); M. W. Nortvedt et al., Reduced Quality of Life Among 
Multiple Sclerosis Patients with Sexual Disturbance and Bladder Dysfunction, 7 MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS 
231 (2001). 
 350. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH ,  MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY OF DIALYSIS: NIH 
CONSENSUS STATEMENT 3 (1993). 
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of the same age without renal disease;351 at age fifty-nine, expected survival 
is only 4.3 years.352 
Individuals with ESRD also experience a substantially increased 
morbidity with a greatly reduced quality of life353 and heightened 
suffering.354 Complications of ESRD include cardiovascular events, such as 
congestive heart failure, heart attack, and stroke, which account for about 
half of the mortality in dialysis patients.355 They are also at high risk for 
nutritional deficiencies, problems with their vascular access sites, infection 
(the major cause of death in fifteen to thirty percent of dialysis patients), 
disorders of calcium and phosphorous metabolism, amyloidosis, and 
anemia.356 They may also have a variety of additional problems, including 
falling blood pressure, severe muscle cramps, lower blood oxygen, nausea, 
seizures, and cardiac arrhythmias.357 
Self-assessed physical and mental health of hemodialysis patients is 
markedly diminished in contrast to that of the general population. 358 A 
variety of scales have been devised to quantify disease severity and 
functional status in ESRD. The first and most widely used instrument to 
measure functional status in ESRD is the Karnofsky Index; scores of under 
seventy points on the modified Karnofsky index indicate significant 
impairment, with inability to perform important daily life activities.359 
Patients who have undergone renal transplantation for ESRD are subject 
to a variety of complications, including graft rejection, infection, malignancy, 
and hypertension.360 Given the range and severity of such complications 
attending the post-surgical period, renal transplant recipients are subject to 
the need for urgent and unpredictable hospitalization. 
 
 
 351. Id. at 4. 
 352. Friedrich K. Port, Morbidity and Mortality in Dialysis Patients, 46 KIDNEY INT’L 1728, 1729 
(1994). 
 353. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 350, at 4. 
 354. Birger Hagren et al., The Haemodialysis Machine as a Lifeline: Experiences of Suffering 
from End-stage Renal Disease, 34 J. ADVANCED NURSING 196, 198-201 (2001). 
 355. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra  note 350, at 16. 
 356. Id. at 17-22. 
 357. Id. at 22. 
 358. Sanjeev K. Mittal et al., Self-assessed Physical and Mental Function of Haemodialysis 
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Individuals with end-stage renal disease should be considered as having a 
disability if they: 
1. Require ongoing hemodialysis; or 
2. Renal transplantation; or 
3. Have a modified Karnofsky Index score of less than 70 (range 0-
100). 
L. Vision Impairments  
Since 1930, in the United States, the definition of a legally blind 
individual is one who has a visual acuity of 20/200 or worse in the better eye 
with best correction, or has a visual field diameter of 20 degrees or less in the 
widest meridian in the better eye.361 However, the functional vision of a 
person with low vision rather than legal blindness, based solely on corrected 
visual acuity, can be misleading, as the standard tests do not accurately 
correlate with visual performance.362 
Low vision is defined as corrected visual acuity between 20/40 and 
20/200 in the better eye.363 In a given population, low vision affects one 
percent of individuals between the ages of forty-three and fifty-four, but 
increases to twenty-six percent of individuals over the age of seventy-five.364 
Low vision can be compounded by other problems including difficulty with 
contrast sensitivity, color vision, adaptation to dark and light, and depth 
perception.365 Also, systemic disorders, such as diabetes, can adversely affect 
normal vision either intermittently or progressively.366 Consequently, 
corrective lenses alone do not mitigate all of the problems of low vision, and 
an assessment of corrected vision is not an accurate indicator of disability. 
Another significant problem affecting functional vision is that of diplopia, 
or double vision, a misalignment of the visual axes in a person with binocular 
 
 
 361. James M. Tielsch, The Epidemiology of Vision Impairment, in 1 THE LIGHTHOUSE 
HANDBOOK ON VISION IMPAIRMENT AND VISION REHABILITATION 5, 6 (Barbara Silverstone et al. 
eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE LIGHTHOUSE HANDBOOK]. 
 362. Id. at 8. 
 363. Id. at 6. 
 364. Ronald Klein et al., Changes in Visual Acuity in a Population: The Beaver Dam Eye Study, 
103 J. AM. ACAD. OPHTHALMOLOGY 1169, 1173 (1996).  
 365. Kent E. Higgens & Ian L. Bailey, Visual Disorders and Performance of Specific Tasks 
Requiring Vision, in THE LIGHTHOUSE HANDBOOK, supra  note 361, at 287, 287.  
 366. Brian Leonard & Steve Charles, Diabetic Retinopathy, in THE LIGHTHOUSE HANDBOOK, 
supra  note 361, at 103. 
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perception.367 This condition can be the result of congenital imbalance of the 
muscles of the eyes or secondary to trauma or eye surgery.368 The result is 
that one object is seen as two, side by side or one higher than the other.369 
Although children with this condition readily adapt, adults do not. Unless 
prisms or surgery can correct the problem, the individual will have constant 
difficulty focusing.370 
The following criteria should be used in defining an individual as having 
a disability based on visual impairment: 
1. Visual acuity of 20/200 or worse in the better eye without 
correction: or 
2. Visual field diameter of 20 degrees or less in the widest meridian 
in the better eye; or 
3. Diplopia that cannot be resolved with corrective prisms or surgery.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Employment discrimination laws serve the dual functions of establishing 
the boundaries of acceptable conduct and providing a means for redress 
when conduct falls outside of those boundaries. Accordingly, employment 
discrimination laws take on both symbolic and practical dimensions. They 
are symbolic in the sense that they codify social norms for personal 
interactions and provide the impetus for voluntary changes in workplace 
policies and relationships. To be successful, employment discrimination laws 
must lead to voluntary changes in conduct in the hiring halls, on the shop 
floors, and in the boardrooms of the nation. The laws also must provide the 
structure for courts to mandate changes in conduct when individuals and 
groups of individuals seek to vindicate their rights through the legal system. 
In either context, the law must be reasonably clear in establishing the 
permitted and proscribed conduct, for without such clarity neither voluntary 
changes nor legally-mandated directives can be implanted. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has established an important 
and noble goal of ending discrimination on the basis of disability. 
Unfortunately, both the symbolic and practical dimensions of the goal have 
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been undermined by the failure to create a reasonably clear definition of the 
crucial term “individual with a disability,” which delineates the class of 
individuals protected by the ADA. Without clarity of definition, both 
voluntary and legally-imposed changes in the workplace are difficult to 
achieve. To make matters worse, when the courts adopt restrictive 
interpretations of coverage they undermine both judicial enforcement and the 
resolve of employers to comply with the spirit of the ADA. 
It would be wrong to place all of the blame on the courts. If courts 
decided cases such as Sutton more in accord with the underlying goals of the 
ADA, the line separating “covered” from “uncovered” disabling conditions 
would be moved, but the blurred nature of the line would not change. Despite 
an understandable reluctance by Congress to amend the ADA, without such 
action there is a danger that the law will soon have merely modest symbolic 
value—a statement of principle lacking the specificity needed to sustain 
changes in conduct. 
In our view, a highly promising yet previously unconsidered approach to 
defining “individual with a disability” under the ADA is to incorporate 
existing medical criteria into the statutory framework. The ADA should be 
amended to authorize the EEOC to conduct rulemaking activity to publish 
medical standards for when the most common disabling conditions satisfy 
the statutory threshold of a “substantial limitation of a major life activity.” 
The presumptions regarding coverage or noncoverage would provide 
essential guidance to all parties, thereby ensuring that the statutory goals will 
be realized.  
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